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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
STEVEN RAY JAMES 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal of a case 
involving a conviction of a capital felony pursuant to Utah Code 
78-2-2(3)(i). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the defendant denied his right to Due Process, right 
to counsel, and right to a fair and impartial jury by the trial 
court's summary questioning of the jurors, denial of questions 
requested by defense counsel, refusal to permit any voir dire by 
counsel, refusal to permit voir dire of individual potential jurors 
out of the presence of the other members of the panel, and 
arbitrarily determining that the jury selection be completed in one 
day? The standard of review is whether the trial judge abused his 
discretion which is required to be exercised liberally in favor of 
allowing counsel to elicit information from prospective jurors. 
State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988). 
2. Should the court have sustained defendant's objection to 
evidence of a California conviction of false imprisonment as the 
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aggravating factor increasing the conviction to first degree murder 
because it was not permitted by statute as an aggravating factor 
or because the provision is unconstitutionally vague and denies the 
defendant due process and equal protection of the law and because 
of great length of time that transpired since the prior conviction? 
Interpretation of a statute, and its constitutionality pose 
questions of law and a trial court's conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness and not given special deference. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 
P.2d 487 (Utah 1989). 
3. Should the court have granted the defendant's Motion For 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or Motion to Record 
Defendant's Conviction For Next Lower Category of Offense due to 
the lack of any substantial evidence regarding an intentional or 
knowing killing? In examining a verdict for insufficiency of the 
evidence, the court will sustain the verdict so long as there is 
some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings 
of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made. 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985), State v. Lamm, 606 
P.2d 229, 231 (1980). 
4. Did the denial of access to his attorneys while in Salt 
Lake County jail violate Appellant's constitutional right to 
counsel and his right of access to the courts? Where actual or 
constructive denial of assistance of counsel occurs, a per se rule 
of prejudice applies. Crutchfield v. Wainwriqht, 803 F.2d 1103, 
1108 (11th Cir. 1986), Chadwick v. Green, 740 F.2d 897, 900 (Utah 
Cir. 1984). 
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5. Did the court commit error by refusing to give certain 
instructions requested by defendant regarding circumstantial 
evidence? Because an appeal challenging the refusal to give jury 
instructions presents questions of law only, no particular 
deference is granted to the trial court's rulings. Ramon v. Farr, 
770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989). 
6. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant Appellant a 
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence? The standard 
of review for denial of trial is the abuse of discretion of the 
trial court. State v. Hadfield, 788 P.2d 506 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The interpretation of the following statutes and rules is 
determinative of the issues involved: 
Issue 1. Rule 18(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant 
to conduct the examination of the prospective jurors 
or may itself conduct the examination. In the 
latter event, the court may permit counsel or the 
defendant to supplement the examination by such 
further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself 
submit to the prospective jurors additional 
questions requested by counsel or the defendant. 
Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah 
Amendment V, Constitution of the United States 
Amendment VI, Constitution of the United States 
Issue 2. Section 76-5-202(1)(h), Utah Code Unannotated 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the 
first degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly 
causes the death of another under any of the 
following circumstances: 
...(h) The actor was previously convicted of 
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first or second degree murder or of a felony 
involving the use or threat of violence to a 
person. For the purpose of this paragraph an 
offense committed in another jurisdiction, 
which if committed in Utah would be punishable 
as first or second degree murder, is deemed 
first or second degree murder. 
Amendment V, Constitution of the United States 
(See above) 
Amendment XIV, Section 1, Constitution of the 
United States 
...nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Article I, Section 7, Constitution of Utah 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 24, Constitution of Utah 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation. 
Issue 3. Section 76-5-202(1) 
(See above) 
Issue 4. Amendment V, Constitution of the United States 
(See above) 
Amendment XIV, Constitution of the United States 
(See above) 
Amendment VI, Constitution of the United States 
(See above) 
Article I, Section 7, Constitution of Utah 
(See above) 
Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah 
(See above) 
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Issue 5. Rule 17(g),(6), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other 
appropriate time, the court shall instruct the jury. 
Issue 6. Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon 
its own initiative, grant a new trial in the 
interest of justice if there is any error or 
impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect 
upon the rights of a party. 
Rule 59(a),(3)and(4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, 
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the 
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any 
of the following causes: 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary 
prudence could not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for 
the party making the application, which he 
could not, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered and produced at trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On Tuesday, August 26, 1986, at approximately 12:54 p.m., the 
Defendant reported that his infant son, Steven Ray James, was 
missing from a parked car near the West entrance of the Osco Drug 
parking lot in Logan, Utah. 
On October 11, 1986 the remains of an infant later identified 
as Steven Ray James were found in Cache County submerged in an 
area known as the Benson Marina by a group of duck hunters. The 
remains had begun to decompose and identification was made through 
forensic testimony concerning the infant's hair, footprints and 
handprints, and identification of the clothing and blanket which 
the body was wrapped in as being similar to clothing and a blanket 
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owned by the baby. 
The actual cause of death was undetermined but the manner of 
death was certified as a homicide by the State Medical Examiner. 
(Tr. 788). There was no objective evidence, however, as to the 
cause of death. 
The Defendant Steven Ray James, is the natural father or the 
decedent, Steven Ray James. He is charged with Criminal Homicide, 
a Capital Felony, it being alleged that the Defendant did 
intentionally or knowingly cause the death of Steven Ray James, 
alleging as an aggravating circumstance that the Defendant has 
previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat 
of violence to a person, that being a 1973 conviction in the State 
of California of the crime of false imprisonment which was there 
categorized as a felony. 
Extensive news media coverage and adverse public opinion 
began immediately after the infant's disappearance and ultimately 
resulted in transferring venue from the First Judicial District 
(Cache County) to the Third Judicial District of (Salt Lake 
County). See State vs. James, 767 P2d 549 (Utah 1989). 
A more complete statement of the course of proceedings and 
facts relevant to the issues is set forth in the individual 
arguments that follow. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Defendant was denied his right of due process, right to 
counsel, and right to a fair and impartial jury under the state 
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and federal constitutions by the trial court's: a) summary 
questioning of the jurors, b) denial of questions requested by the 
defense counsel, c) refusal to permit any voir dire by defense 
counsel, d) refusal to permit voir dire of individual potential 
jurors out of the presence of other members of the panel, and, e) 
arbitrarily determining that the jury selection be completed in 
one day. 
II. Section 76-5-202(1)(h) limits the offenses which may be 
considered for purposes of aggravating circumstances to 
convictions of first or second degree murder or a felony involving 
the use or threat of violence to a person. However, foreign 
convictions are limited to first or second degree murder or 
homicides that would be punishable as first or second degree 
murder if committed in the state of Utah. In the alternative, 
factor (h) violates Due Process and Equal Protection. 
III. The court should have granted defendant's motion for 
judgement notwithstanding the verdict or motion to record 
defendant's conviction for next lower category or offense because 
there was no substantial evidence of a killing or of an 
intentional or knowing killing by defendant. 
IV. The denial of access to his attorneys while in Salt Lake 
County jail violated Appellant's constitutional right to counsel 
and his right of access to the courts. 
V. The court committed error by refusing to give certain 
instructions requested by defendant regarding circumstantial 
evidence. 
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VI. The trial court erred in refusing to grant a new trial 
on the ground of newly discovered evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS, RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL, AND RIGHT TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY UNDER THE STATE 
AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS BY THE TRIAL COURT'S 
A) SUMMARY QUESTIONING OF THE JURORS, 
B) DENIAL OF QUESTIONS REQUESTED BY DEFENSE COUNSEL, 
C) REFUSAL TO PERMIT ANY VOIR DIRE BY DEFENSE COUNSEL, 
D) REFUSAL TO PERMIT VOIR DIRE OF INDIVIDUAL POTENTIAL JURORS 
OUT OF THE PRESENCE OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PANEL, AND, 
E) ARBITRARILY DETERMINING THAT THE JURY SELECTION BE 
COMPLETED IN ONE DAY. 
While the Utah Rules of Criminal Precedence place a great 
deal of discretion with the trial court as to the examination of 
the prospective jurors, that discretion is circumscribed by the 
provisions in the state and federal constitutions guaranteeing to 
the defendant the rights of Due Process, counsel, and a fair and 
impartial jury. The scheme of jury selection utilized by the 
trial court in this case deprived the defendant of the opportunity 
to develop meaningful information for the exercise of challenges 
for cause or peremptory challenges. 
Rule 18(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, formerly 
Utah Code Annotated, 78-35-18(b), ostensibly permits the extremely 
limited voir dire of prospective jurors that was conducted totally 
by the court in this case. That Rule provides: 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to 
conduct the examination of the prospective jurors or may 
itself conduct the examination. In the latter event, the 
court may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement 
the examination by such further inquiry as it deems 
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proper, or may itself submit to the prospective jurors 
additional questions requested by counsel or the 
defendant. 
However, the procedure used under Rule 18 must be open enough 
to afford defendant his constitutional rights. 
The Utah Constitution provides: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right 
to appear and defend in person and by counsel... [and] 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.... 
Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah 
In addition, the federal constitution provides similar 
protections. 
No person shall...be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law.... 
Amendment V, Constitution of the United States 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury...and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
Amendment VI, Constitution of the United States 
These rights are made applicable to the defendant through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
....No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States.... 
Amendment XIV, Constitution of the United States 
The quest for an impartial jury in this case by the defendant 
was not a meaningless and inconsequential attempt at technical 
purity. The defendant had gone to great lengths to have the venue 
transferred from Cache County to Salt Lake County to escape the 
substantial community antipathy toward him that had been engendered 
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by extensive pre-trial publicity accompanying the case. Though 
feelings ran high in Cache County, the news publicity was largely 
created by television with state-wide coverage, and the issues of 
pre-trial publicity and the pre-formed opinions or feelings of any 
kind on the part of the jurors needed to be explored with some 
thoroughness. As it turned out, so little was learned from the 
potential jurors through the voir dire procedure adopted by the 
trial court, that the transfer of the case to a different venue 
became an exercise in futility. 
Trial began on May 1, 1989. Prior to trial, at a pre-trial 
conference on April 7, 1989, the court had informed the parties 
that it would use a jury questionnaire and invited the parties to 
supplement the court's questions with questions of their own. 
(Trans, of April 7 Pretrial, p. 17.) Whereupon the defendant 
prepared proposed questions designed to elicit a meaningful profile 
of each potential juror, not only with regard to pre-trial 
publicity but many of the other issues in the case. 
Thereafter, at a second pre-trial conference on April 19, 
1989, the court informed the parties that it would not use a 
written jury questionnaire. 
The reasons are multitude, but, in essence, with the 
death penalty no longer an issue in this case [the 
prosecution having just informed the Court that it had 
decided to not seek the death penalty], the Court is of 
the opinion that a fair and impartial jury can be 
selected as expediently and as appropriately, without 
use of the written jury questionnaire, and one will not 
be submitted.... 
(Trans, of April 19 Pretrial, p. 4 11. 11-17) 
Defense Counsel then requested of the Court an outline of the 
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court's proposed voir dire for purposes of supplementation. This 
the court agreed to, specifically inviting counsel to supplement 
"in any way" those proposed questions, subject to approval by the 
Court. (PT p. 5, 11. 7-8). Defense counsel then attempted to 
address the issue of the questionnaire but was put off, the Court 
indicating it would resolve it later. (PT p.5, 11. 9-14). 
The Court thereafter denied the defendant's motion for 
individual sequestered voir dire of the prospective jurors, (Court 
Record, p. 1086-1088) (Exhibit B), or in the alternative, in 
smaller panels, to permit in-depth questioning of potential jurors' 
prior contact with information about the case and opinions formed 
thereon without tainting the rest of the panel. Counsel also 
argued that such would promote greater openness and candor. 
Despite denying the motion, the Court, at that point in time gave 
the following assurance , which later proved illusory: 
There will be ample give and take in the jury selection 
process. The Court will insure that a fair and impartial 
jury is selected, and counsel will be given every 
opportunity during that process to provide input on an 
on-going basis. 
(PT p. 9, 11. 20-23) 
Defense counsels' motion for voir dire by counsel was 
summarily denied. (PT p. 10, 11. 2-8). 
Defense counsel submitted to the Court written supplementary 
questions for voir dire. (Court Record, pp. 909-931) (Exhibit A). 
At the trial itself, the list of questions asked by the judge 
of each juror was extremely short. After a few standard questions 
about name, occupation, educational background, and marital status, 
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etc., the first question dealing with the circumstances of this 
case was: "Q. Have you heard anything about this case on the 
television, on the radio, or have you read anything in the paper?" 
(Trial Trans, p. 10, 11. 4-6). (All further references will be to 
Trial transcript unless otherwise specified). 
Most of the potential jurors answered in the affirmative. The 
follow-up question posed by the court was: "Q. As a result of the 
publicity given to this particular case, have you formed an opinion 
regarding the defendant's innocence or guilt?" (Trans, p. 10, 11. 
8-10). No follow-up was asked if the person answered negatively. 
Only five indicated they had formed an opinion and were excused for 
cause. 
At the close of the courtvs initial voir dire, the Court ask 
one additional question of the entire panel. "Of those jurors who 
have been questioned individually and collectively, has anyone 
expressed an opinion to you regarding the innocence or the guilt 
of the defendant? The Court notes no response." (p. 167, 11. 16-
19). The Court asked none of the supplemental questions submitted 
by defendant. 
Interestingly, immediately after this question to which no one 
responded, the Court requested one of the potential jurors, Mrs. 
Peak, who had earlier indicated that she was acquainted with the 
defendant, to explain her response. In the privacy of chambers, 
when she was again asked the above question, she responded in the 
affirmative. The Court then asked: "Q. What was that opinion? 
A. That they thought he was guilty." (p. 170, 11. 5,6). She was 
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dismissed for cause. 
The Court then requested arguments regarding excusing any of 
the remaining jurors for cause. Defense counsel then informed the 
Court that it had inadequate information to proceed in that regard 
(p. 173, 11. 3-9) and requested permission to individually voir 
dire those individuals who had received pre-trial information about 
the case to explain the source of such information and further 
explain any opinion formed. In addition, such questioning was 
especially necessary with regards to a number of the jurors who had 
responded with hesitancy when asked if they had formed an opinion, 
(pp. 173-174, 11. 11-10). The judge denied the request for 
individual questioning of the jurors. (p. 174, 1. 11). The Court 
invited further questions for the panel. 
The Court agreed to identify jurors with grandchildren, ask 
whether law enforcement friends and relatives of jurors 
investigated homicides, but refused to ask whether these jurors 
would feel that they would have to explain their verdict, if not 
guilty, to these friends or relatives. (p. 175, 11. 11-24). 
Upon being requested again, defense counsel refused to pass 
for cause. Defense counsel again made it clear that he had 
insufficient information on which to proceed with making the 
challenges for cause, to which the Court replied that counsel could 
move to excuse each one for cause, (pp. 181-2, 11. 13-8). Defense 
counsel requested then, in light of the restricted voir dire to be 
permitted additional peremptory challenges. This was denied, (p. 
182, 11. 9-16). 
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Of the 32 remaining prospective jurors on the panel, 20 were 
challenged for cause due to inadequate voir dire with regards to 
the issues of pre-trial publicity and opinions, all of which were 
denied. After exercise of peremptory challenges, eight of the 
twelve jurors chosen had been inadequately questioned regarding 
these issues, the other four having indicated not being aware of 
information pertaining to the case. 
However, at the beginning of the second day of trial, prior 
to exercising his peremptory challenges, the defendant filed a 
written Obiection to Voir Dire of Jury Panel and Defendant's Being 
Compelled to Prematurely Exercise Peremptory Challenges in which 
he requested the Court to reopen voir dire, permit voir dire by 
counsel, that the voir dire, whether by counsel or the Court, be 
outside the presence of other jurors, and that the questions 
previously submitted by the defendant in writing to the Court be 
asked of the prospective jurors. (Court Record, pp. 938-944) 
(Exhibit C). This request was denied and the Court directed the 
peremptories to be used. (pp. 214-215, 11. 20-6). 
The selection of the jury plus alternates was not quite 
completed in one day, the Court's stated goal, but was completed 
early in the morning of the second day. The entire procedure 
utilized by the Court appeared to be designed toward reaching the 
goal of having the jury selection completed in the least time 
possible. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently addressed the concern about 
adequate voir dire in State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Ut. 1988) in 
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which the defendant was being tried on the charge of second degree 
murder of his three year old stepdaughter. Discounting the 
defendant's contention that the Court had unduly restricted his 
attorney's voir dire of prospective jurors, the Court specifically 
noted that when it was apparent that panel members had been exposed 
to press coverage, the trial court permitted voir dire by counsel 
in chambers and did not prevent defense counsel from asking any 
specific questions. In that case unlike the present one, the 
defendant's counsel was permitted 1) direct contact with the 
prospective jurors, 2) in chambers, 3) without limitation as to 
relevant questions where pre-trial publicity was involved. 
The Worthen opinion, supporting liberal voir dire with wide 
latitude being permitted to counsel, followed State v. Ball, 685 
P. 2d 1055 (Ut. 1984) which reversed a conviction because of 
improperly limited voir dire. The Worthen opinion states: 
Only counsel will, at the beginning, have a clear 
overview of the entire case and the type of evidence 
likely to be addressed. Voir dire should not be 
restricted to a "stark little exercise" which discloses 
little. 
Worthen, at 845. 
The Worthen case goes on to emphasize the importance of braud 
voir dire in cases, such as the present case, with substantial pre-
trial publicity and the added factor of citizens of Utah being 
especially concerned about the issues of child abuse and child 
sexual abuse. Worthen, at 848 citing State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d at 
561. 
The Ball case sets out more fully the need for direct voir 
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dire by defense counsel. Voir dire is intended to be used 
carefully and skillfully be counsel and court so that biases and 
prejudices, latent as well as acknowledged, that will interfere 
with a fair trial can be discovered. 
The most characteristic feature of prejudice is its 
inability to recognize itself. It is unrealistic to 
expect that any but the most sensitive and thoughtful 
jurors (frequently those least likely to be biased) will 
have the personal insight, candor, and openness to raise 
their hands in court and declare themselves biased. 
Ball at 1058. 
The Ball case also points to the critical use of voir dire for 
the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges, referring to 
State v. Taylor. 664 P.2d 439, 447 in which a conviction for 
pornography was reversed. But Ball goes further and indicates that 
undue deference should not be given to the availability of 
peremptories. Peremptories not only may be relatively meaningless 
if based on inadequate information, but are, in addition, 
insufficient remedy for inadequate voir dire so as to be able to 
exercise challenges for cause. 
The Ball case was also recently cited in the Utah Court of 
Appeals decision Hornsby v. Corp of the Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 
(1988) in which it was held to be error to not permit voir dire as 
to the juror's group affiliations. "Substantial impairment of the 
right to informed exercise of peremptory challenges is reversible 
error." p. 933 citing Ball and Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 
220, 85 S.Ct. 824, 836, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965). 
Courts outside the state of Utah have been strongly supportive 
of defendant's position. Many courts have found in particular that 
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questions requiring jurors subjective evaluation of their ability 
to be fair and impartial have consistently been held to be an 
inadequate basis upon which to assess jurors' qualifications. 
E.g., Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975); Irvin v. Dowd, 
366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961); United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 197 
(5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 879 (9th 
Cir. 1974); Patriarca v. United States, 402 F.2d 314, 318 (1st Cir. 
1968), cert, denied, 393 U.S. 1022 (1969); United States ex rel. 
Blaeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364, 372 (2d Cir.) cert, denied, 372 U.S. 
978 (1963); United States v. Marcello, 280 F.Supp. 510, 514 
(E.O.La. 1968), off'd 423 F.2d 993 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 398 
U.S. 959 (1970). See also United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 
1333, 1345-46 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976). 
But see United State v. Pomponio, 563 F.2d 659, 665 (4th Cir. 1977) 
cert, denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978) (where no specific news items 
were brought to Court's attention, it was sufficient to address 
general questions to entire venue, requiring self-assessment of 
ability to render a just verdict exclusively on evidence in court). 
Similarly, in United States v. Dillinger, the Seventh Circuit 
stated: 
The government's position...rest[s] upon an assumption 
that a general question to the group whether there is any 
reason they could not be fair and impartial can be relied 
on to produce a disclosure of any disqualifying state of 
mind. We do not believe that a prospective juror is so 
alert to his own prejudices. 
472 F.2d 340, 367 (7th Cir. 1972) cert, denied, 410 U.S. 970 
(1973). 
In a concurrence with the United States Supreme Court's 
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decision in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 224 (1982), Justice 
O'Connor voted that: "Determining whether a juror is biased or has 
prejudged a case is difficult, partly because the juror may have 
had an interest in concealing his own bias and partly because the 
juror may be unaware of it." 445 U.S. at 221-22. The Illinois 
Supreme Court considered jurors' ability to readily articulate bias 
where prospective jurors were exposed to publicity reporting that 
a co-defendant had been released after passing a lie detector test. 
"Whether or not the juror is aware of it or can express his 
feelings accurately, exposure to this type of highly inflammatory 
material is enough to raise the presumption of partiality." People 
v. Taylor, 462 U.E.2d 478, 486 (111. 1984). 
In United States v. Blanton, 700 F.2d 298, 308 (6th Cir. 
1983), modified, 719 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 104 
S.Ct. 1592 (1984), the Court reviewed Supreme Court cases and 
circuit court holdings on the question of juror self-assessment of 
impartiality and concludes that holdings in the Second, Fifth, 
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits and dicta in the First and District 
of Columbia circuits indicate disapproval of reliance on juror 
self-assessment of impartiality where there has been substantial 
pre-trial publicity. The Sixth Circuit initially reversed the 
conviction in Blanton in part because the voir dire provided 
inadequate information. The Court subsequently affirmed the 
conviction finding that while the judge probably did not use the 
best procedure possible, he did not abuse his discretion and the 
examination sufficed to produce an impartial jury. 719 F.2d at 
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817. Although conducted in the presence of an entire jury panel, 
voir dire was relatively extensive, pre-voir dire questionnaires 
were filled out by prospective jurors, and twenty additional 
peremptory challenges were granted to the defense over the 
government's objection. 719 F.2d 819, 827-28. 
The Third Circuit recently considered this issue and concluded 
that it was insufficient, for the purpose of identifying bias, to 
ask a prospective juror: 
[Have you] received any information in this matter, that 
has not been part of the evidence in the case, which you 
consider has rendered you incapable of giving a fair 
trial to either side in this case. 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 136 (3rd 
Cir. 1987). 
The Court concluded that: 
the likelihood of substantive prejudice turns on all of 
the surrounding circumstances, the most important being 
the nature of the information learned by the jurors and 
the manner in which it was conveyed. [Citations 
omitted.] 
814 F.2d at 138. 
The Court went on to criticize the trial court for adopting 
"a procedure which effectively transferred to the jury the 
responsibilities for determining its own impartiality." 814 F.2d 
at 141. 
The total exclusion of any attorney in conducted voir dire in 
a case involving a charge of first degree murder impinges not only 
on the defendant's constitutional rights to due process and an 
impartial jury but also on his constitutional right to counsel. 
While many courts have not been willing to go so far as to find 
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that defendants have a constitutional right to voir dire conducted 
by their attorney in all cases, there is strong support that in a 
case of this magnitude some attorney voir dire should be permitted. 
There are several strong practical reasons attorney-conducted 
voir dire is a better tool for eliciting honest responses than is 
voir dire conducted by the judge. ABA Standards Relating to Juror 
Use and Management, (1983), Standard 7(b) recommends attorney 
participation. Courts have also indicated the same. 
. . .Exclusive voir dire examination by the Court does not 
take into account the fact that it is the parties, rather 
than the court, who have a full grasp of the nuances and 
the strengths and weaknesses of the case.... Experience 
indicates that in the majority of situations questioning 
by counsel would be more likely to [gain the necessary 
information upon which to base intelligent exercise of 
peremptory challenges] than an exclusive examination in 
general terms by the court. 
United States v. Ible, 630 F.2d 389, 395 (5th Cir. 1980). See 
United States v. Ledee, 549 F.2d 990, 993 (5th Cir. ) cert, denied, 
434 U.S. 902 (1977) (court does not know the strengths and 
weaknesses of a case); and Silverthorne v. United States, 400 U.S. 
1022 (1971) (under same circumstances the defense must have the 
right to conduct voir dire) . See also Gutman, The Attorney-
Conducted Voir Dire of Jurors: A Constitutional Right, 39 Brooklyn 
L. Rev. 290 (1972). The requirements of Ible and Ledee can be 
satisfied if the Court poses counsel's suggested inquiries 
according to United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir.) 
cert, denied, 106 S.Ct. 277 (1985). 
The status difference between the judge and prospective jurors 
has an impact on how jurors respond in a judge-conducted voir dire. 
When the interviewer is of significantly higher social status, the 
respondent's "evaluation apprehension" is increased. The greater 
the status difference or social distance between interviewer and 
subject, the greater the tendency of the subject to give answers 
the subject believes the interviewer would like to hear. See, 
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generally, Lindyez and Aronson (eds.), The Handbook of Social 
Psychology (2nd ed.) Reading, Mass., Addison-Wealey, 1969, for 
discussion of interviewing and interviewer-respondent interaction. 
In the courtroom, the judge is the person of highest status and 
authority. As a result, jurors are acutely aware of subtle cues 
or indications from the judge. The message often communicated by 
the judge is that impartiality or lack of bias is a desirable state 
of mind for a juror. Thus, the status difference between judge and 
jurors is likely to inhibit juror candor. See Judges' Nonverbal 
Behavior in Jury Trials: A Threat to Juror Impartiality. 61 
Va.L.Rev. 1266 (1975). 
The use of closed-ended questions that are general in scope 
compound the problem. Such questions implicitly suggest the 
correct or most socially desirable response. See Coleman v. Kemp, 
778 F.2d 1487, 1542-43 (11th Cir. 1985). 
Reducing the social distance between questioner and respondent 
through active participation in the voir dire by attorneys can 
increase candor. Attorneys' familiarity with the case can lead 
them to frame narrowly focused questions. Nonverbal communication 
between attorneys and prospective jurors can provide signs of bias. 
Jurors are more likely to display tension, evasion, or overt 
hostility when questioned by counsel. A recent study comparing 
responses of jury-eligible community residents questioned by a 
judge and by an attorney found that jurors are more honest in their 
responses to attorneys. Jones, Judge Verses Attorney-Conducted 
Voir Dire; An Empirical Investigation of Juror Candor, 11 Law and 
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Human Behavior 131 (June 1987). 
One state court has taken the step of finding that a 
defendant's right to counsel under that state's constitution 
inherently includes the right of his counsel to question the 
prospective jurors. Smith v. State. 703 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Cir. App. 
1985). 
Finding such right contained under Article 1, Section 10 of 
the Texas Constitution, the court stated: 
A defendant's counsel must be allowed to interrogate the 
jury panel: to the end that he may form his own 
conclusion, after his personal contact with the juror, 
as to whether in counsel's judgment he [the juror] would 
be acceptable to him or whether...he should exercise a 
peremptory challenge. 
Smith at 643. 
With regard to the argument that such is not practical due to 
time constraints, the court responded: 
In addition, we find that, although time constraints on 
voir dire are a legitimate concern of a trial judge, the 
paramount concern in a case such as this must be the 
appellant's freedom to intelligently exercise his 
peremptory challenges.... It is always commendable for 
a trial court to dispatch business with promptness and 
expedition, but this salutary result must never be 
attained at the risk of denying to a party on trial a 
substantial right. 
Smith at 645. 
The Utah Court should decide that in at least some cases, the 
defendant has a constitutional right to attorney-conducted voir 
dire. 
The defendant's right to meaningful voir dire could have also 
been ameliorated by individual or small group examination of 
jurors. The inhibiting effect of the presence of a large group of 
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jurors is well stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Irwin v. Dowd; 
No doubt each juror was sincere when he said that he 
would be fair and impartial. . .but the psychological 
impact of requiring such a declaration before one's 
fellows is often its father. 
366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961). 
The problem that the issue of news publicity adds to openness 
in the group was recognized in Coppedge v. United States: 
It is too much to expect of human nature that a juror 
would volunteer, in open court, before his fellow jurors, 
that he would be influenced in his verdict by a newspaper 
story of the trial. 
272 F.2d 504, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1959). 
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice recommends questioning 
of individual jurors outside the presence of other prospective 
jurors in criminal cases where questions of possible prejudice are 
raised and goes on to state: 
The questioning shall be conducted for the purpose of 
determining what the prospective juror has read or heard 
about the case and how his exposure has affected his 
attitude towards the trial, not to convince him that he 
would be derelict in his duty if he could not cast aside 
any preconceptions he might have. 
(Standard 8-3.5(a)). 
The opening of jurors' responsiveness was graphically 
illustrated by Mrs. Peak, mentioned above, who, though still being 
questioned by the judge, responded with substantive information 
and was thereafter excused for cause when, minutes before, in the 
presence of the other prospective jurors, she had made no response. 
Adoption of any of defense counsel's requests would no doubt 
have extended the jury selection process somewhat beyond the 
Court's goal of completion in one day, but could have helped to 
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avoid the fairly meaningless exercise that was performed in this 
case. 
II. 
SECTION 76-5-202(1)(h) LIMITS THE OFFENSES WHICH MAY BE 
CONSIDERED FOR PURPOSES OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES TO CONVICTIONS 
OF FIRST OR SECOND DEGREE MURDER OR A FELONY INVOLVING THE USE OR 
THREAT OF VIOLENCE TO A PERSON. HOWEVER, FOREIGN CONVICTIONS ARE 
LIMITED TO FIRST OR SECOND DEGREE MURDER OR HOMICIDES THAT WOULD 
BE PUNISHABLE AS FIRST OR SECOND DEGREE MURDER IF COMMITTED IN THE 
STATE OF UTAH. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FACTOR (h) VIOLATES DUE PROCESS 
AND EQUAL PROTECTION. 
Section 76-5-202(1)(h) defines criminal homicide as murder in 
the first degree: 
...if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the 
death of another under any of the following 
circumstances: 
(h) The actor was previously convicted of first or 
second degree murder or of a felony involving the use or 
threat of violence to a person. For purposes of this 
paragraph an offense committed in another jurisdiction, 
which if committed in Utah would be punishable as first 
or second degree murder, is deemed first or second degree 
murder. 
Section 202 is specific in delineating the offenses which are 
to be included as aggravating circumstances with respect to murder 
in the first degree prosecutions. The Appellant is not aware of 
any cases specifically related to an examination of this issue and 
submits that it is a case of first impression with the above Court. 
The Appellant submits that the California conviction of False 
Imprisonment, although a felony in the State of California pursuant 
to Section 236 of the Penal Code of the State of California, would 
be classified as Unlawful Detention, a Class B Misdemeanor, in the 
State of Utah. See Section 76-5-304, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
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amended. 
Objection was made to the admissibility of the California 
conviction and to the unconstitutionality of the statute. (Tr. of 
Phase II of Jury Trial, p. 2-6). (Ct. Record, p. 782-783) (Exhibit 
D). The motion was denied, (p. 9, 11. 20-24). 
Section 76-5-202(1)(h) clearly limits convictions which may 
be considered as an aggravating circumstance to first and second 
degree murder convictions or to other homicide convictions which 
would be punishable in the State of Utah as first or second degree 
murder. The Defendant submits that the other felonies described 
in this subsection must be Utah convictions in order for a felony 
involving the use or threat of violence to a person to be properly 
considered as an aggravating circumstance. It appears that the 
legislature has sought to limit the circumstances under which 
foreign convictions may be considered as aggravating circumstances 
to the limited few described herein. In any event, it appears that 
even a foreign homicide conviction must be punishable as a first 
or second degree murder in order to qualify. No less of a standard 
should be applied to the lesser felonies and as stated, the 
felonious conduct in California would only have resulted in a 
misdemeanor conviction in the State of Utah. 
Alternatively, this court should find aggravating factor (h) 
to be void for vagueness. A criminal statute must be sufficiently 
clear and definite to inform persons of ordinary intelligence what 
their conduct must be to conform to its requirements and to advise 
one accused of violating it what constitutes the offense with which 
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he is charged. A statute that does not meet this test is invalid 
under both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States constitution and Article I, Section 7, of the 
Utah Constitution. State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d, 1321 (Utah 1986). 
Although implied by the statute, the statute is ambiguous as to the 
treatment of foreign felonies involving use or threat of violence 
if less than first and second degree murder. 
Finally, the application of factor (h) would be a denial of 
defendant's rights to equal protection of the law. The California 
charge of false imprisonment could be charged as a low grade felony 
in one state, as in California, and a misdemeanor of unlawful 
detention in Utah or any other state, and the charge and 
disposition of a case would turn entirely on the circumstance of 
which state the prior conviction occurred in. This disparate 
treatment of individuals based on prior geographic location of a 
prior conviction is certainly a denial of equal protection of the 
law. 
III. 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGEMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR MOTION TO RECORD DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTION FOR NEXT LOWER CATEGORY OF OFFENSE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO 
SUBSTANTIAL. EVIDENCE OF A KILLING OR OF AN INTENTIONAL OR KNOWING 
KILLING BY DEFENDANT. 
In the light most favorable to the State, there was no 
substantial evidence from which a reasonable juror could have 
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had 
intentionally or knowingly killed his infant son. 
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The defendant was charged with and found guilty by a jury of 
Murder in the First Degree, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 76-5-202 which provides: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first 
degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the 
death of another...• 
The test for overturning a verdict for insufficiency of the 
evidence requires that the Court must find "that reasonable minds 
must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's 
guilt." State v. Watts. 675 P.2d 566, 568; State v. Petree, 659 
P.2d 443 (1983). 
In the light most favorable to the State, the facts are as 
follows. On August 26, 1986, at 12:54 p.m., Steven Ray James 
called the Cache County Sheriff's office and reported that his 
child had been kidnapped, that he had left his 3 month old son in 
his car while he ran into Osco Drug and that when he came out,-the 
child was missing. 
An infant's body was located on October 11, 1986 in a marsh 
several miles from town. The body was wrapped in a mattress cover, 
similar to those owned by a former landlord of Defendant's and used 
by the defendant and his girlfriend to move to Logan, (pp. 348-9, 
11. 19-18), and was tied with an electrical cord and weighted with 
rocks. The palm prints and footprints of the partially decomposed 
body were identified as being similar to those of the Defendant's 
infant son and the body was dressed similarly to the disappeared 
infant. 
The child's mother, Victoria DeLeon, had left the child in 
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Steven James' care when she left for work that morning. A neighbor 
in the apartment upstairs confirmed hearing the baby crying from 
approximately 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. when she left. The State 
presented additional witnesses whose testimony attempted to show, 
through circumstantial evidence, that the infant may not have been 
present in the vehicle when parked near Osco Drug and could have 
been disposed of by the Defendant between 10:00 a.m. and 12:54 p.m. 
In addition, Victoria DeLeon testified to an instance in which 
the infant had been cold and not breathing well when she came home 
while Steven was finishing the baby's bath, (p. 310-311, 11. 16-
19), another in which he had taken the crying baby out to the cold 
garage, lightly wrapped, in order to let Victoria sleep, (p. 312-
313, 11. 10-18), a time she found a red mark on the child's upper 
lip which Steven said was caused by the bottle, (p. 317-318, 11. 
18-5), a time when the child fell from the front seat to the floor 
while Steven was driving and infant was not in a safety carrier, 
(p.313-314, 11. 19-22), a time when the child's head was bumped on 
a door when being carried by Steven, (p.320-321, 11. 20-18), 
several occasions of red marks on the child's neck which Steven 
told her were caused by the shirt, and an occasion of finger marks 
on the child's rib cage at which Victoria complained to Steven that 
he was too rough and should be more careful, (p. 319-320, 11. 6-
2), and a time when the baby was crying, and he said it had fallen 
while he was opening a can. (p. 311-312, 11. 20-9). 
She reported he had once referred to the child as a "fucking 
kid" when watching movies at home and the baby was crying on the 
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couch next to Steven while he was caring for it. (p. 353-354, 11. 
20-7). She also reported an incident shortly after the child's 
birth when the child was crying and she discovered that Steve had 
put the heating pad on hot instead of just warm. (p. 354-355, 11. 
8-6). 
She testified that she does not know if Steven used drugs 
after the child was born although he had used them prior to the 
baby's birth and went to Salt Lake once in July after the baby's 
birth for that purpose, (pp. 326-331, 11. 15-23). 
Victoria testified further that she perceived he was jealous 
of the attention she was giving to the child, (pp. 321-323, 11. 24-
2). 
Dr. Todd Grey, Assistant Medical Examiner for the State of 
Utah performed the autopsy on the decomposing infant baby. The 
changes of decomposition made it difficult to ascribe a cause. 
"In the cause of death, I certified this as undetermined. 
Basically, that means that there was nothing I could find in my 
examination that would adequately explain how this individual came 
to their death." (p. 788, 11. 13-16). However, in the manner of 
death, this was ascribed as a homicide given the manner in which 
the body had been wrapped and disposed of. (p. 788, 11. 17-22). 
He found no evidence of sharp or blunt forced injuries. There 
was no fracturing of bones, skull, things of a very destructive 
nature, (p. 789). He could not rule out shaking, suffocation, or 
drowning, (p. 789) or, on the other hand, say that any of these 
were the cause. (p. 795-6). 
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Steven Ray James is accused of Violating Utah Code Ann. 
Section 76-5-202 (1983 as amended) which requires a knowing or 
intentional killing. The defendant asserts that there is no 
evidence of a killing or of a knowing or intentional killing, and 
filed a Motion For Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (Ct. 
Record, p. 1048-9) (Exhibit E) and Motion to Record Defendant's 
Conviction for Next Lower Category of Offense (Ct. Record, p. 1046-
7) (Exhibit F). The court denied the motions. (Sentencing Trans., 
p. 5, 11. 10-14). 
Cases in which this Court has found sufficient evidence of 
intentional killing have all involved cases where there was medical 
evidence of the cause of death. In State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050 
(1987), the medical evidence showed death by drowning. In State 
v. Fisher, the medical evidence showed the cause of death as 
strangulation. In State v. Watts. 675 P.2d 566 (1983) the cause 
of death was peritonitis due to the rupture of the small intestine 
caused by a severe blow, the bruises consistent with the size of 
a shower-massage shower head which the defendant used to bathe the 
child. 
On the other hand, the Court has been reluctant to sustain a 
conviction where the cause of death has been speculative either 
because of lack of medical evidence to the cause, or, even where 
medical cause is showing, because of lack of evidence of a specific 
death-causing act of the defendant. 
In two cases where the quantum of evidence approximated that 
of this case, the Court reversed the convictions. In State v. 
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Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (1983), while the Court found that the corpus 
delicti of a homicide was established by the death, concealment of 
skeletal remains, and unnatural position of the body, it also found 
that evidence that the defendant was the last person seen with the 
victim the evening before the defendant left the state, and that 
he had recounted "dreams" of hurting and perhaps killing a girl to 
family members was insufficient to sustain a conviction of second 
degree murder• The court went on to add: 
Even if the evidence proved that defendant caused her 
death, it is manifestly insufficient to prove that he did 
so "intentionally or knowingly" as was charged in this 
complaint for murder in the second degree. (p. 447). 
In State v. Bassett, 495 P.2d 318 (1972), where medical 
evidence showed that the cause of death to the 2 1/2 month old 
infant was sub-dural hematoma and fractured ribs, the Court 
reversed an involuntary manslaughter conviction against the parents 
because there was no evidence to show a specific act on the part 
of the defendants. 
See also State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986). In 
Hansen, the defendant and co-defendant went to the deceased's house 
where the defendant hog-tied the victim and stole various items. 
The house was then set on fire and Steward, the victim, died from 
burns and carbon monoxide poisoning. Hansen was charged with and 
convicted of first degree murder under Utah Code Ann. Section 76-
5-202(1) (d) (1953 as amended) by knowingly or intentionally killing 
Steward during the commission of the felony of aggravated arson. 
On appeal the Court examined the issue of whether failure to 
give the defendant's proffered instruction that Hansen committed 
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an unintentional killing during the course of a burglary or robbery 
(a second degree murder under the felony-murder rule as set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. Section 76-5-202 (1953 as amended) was error. 
The Court reversed the conviction and found the jury should have 
been given the option of finding Hansen was "not responsible for 
the fire yet was still guilty of a felony during which an 
unintentional killing occurred." Id.. at 24. Clearly, the Utah 
Supreme Court has recognized in the Hansen case that clear evidence 
of an intentional or knowing state of mind is required for a First 
Degree Homicide conviction. More recently, the Court stated in 
State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), that "[n]o 
unintentional, negligent, or accidental killing, regardless of the 
circumstances, can be first degree murder." Tillman, at 569. 
Courts other than in Utah have dealt explicitly with the issue 
of permissible inferences that can be drawn from disposal of a body 
and attempts to conceal the death, in addition to the Utah Court 
in Bassett, supra. 
The fact that the defendant buried the body, repeatedly 
lied concerning the disappearance of Blanche, went under 
an assumed name and, while awaiting trial, escaped from 
jail, was properly submitted to the jury, as evidence of 
guilt and consciousness of guilt, but the same does not 
serve to supply the missing element of malice." [our 
emphasis]. 
Stafford v. People, 388 P.2d 774, 778 (Col., 1964). That case 
earlier explains: 
The circumstances which distinguish murder from 
manslaughter have been passed upon by this court in many 
cases. Malice necessary to constitute a killing murder 
is presumed where the act is deliberate and likely to be 
attended with dangerous or fatal consequences." 
Stafford, at 778 quoting People v. Crenshaw, 298 111. 412, 131 N.E. 
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576, 15 ALR 671. 
Malice, of course, is the term formerly used in homicide 
statutes in referring to knowing and intentional acts of killing. 
In the case at bar, the facts as presented at the trial may 
support an allegation of an unintentional killing, but do not 
support an allegation of an intentional or knowing killing, as is 
required for First Degree Murder. 
The medical examiner could not identify the cause of death and 
the circumstantial evidence presented by the state showed 
occasional careless or rough treatment of the infant by the 
Defendant and at times impatience and jealousy. 
If the Court agrees that there is no substantial evidence of 
an intentional or knowing killing, then the court could hold that 
at most, the evidence supports a conviction of Negligent Homicide 
or Manslaughter, pursuant to Section 76-5-206 or Section 76-5-205, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). Section 76-5-206 classifies as 
a Negligent Homicide any death of another caused while one is 
acting with criminal negligence. Section 76-5-205 classifies as 
manslaughter any death of another caused while one is acting 
recklessly or while under the influence of extreme emotional 
disturbance. In this case, therefore, the evidence established at 
most only a Negligent Homicide or Manslaughter, and clearly did not 
establish a First Degree Murder. 
IV. 
THE DENIAL OF ACCESS TO HIS ATTORNEYS WHILE IN SALT LAKE 
COUNTY JAIL VIOLATED APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
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AND HIS RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS. 
Appellant was held in Cache County jail until shortly before 
trial. Venue was changed by interlocutory appeal, and Appellant 
was moved to Salt Lake County jail for the trial. 
Appellant's attorneys were told that they would be able to 
consult with Appellant at 9:00 p.m. at the Salt Lake County jail 
on the evening before the trial. When they arrived, however, the 
guard told them that the facility was closed and denied them 
access. 
The trial began the next day. Appellant's attorneys explained 
the situation to the judge, who said he would see to it that such 
problems were resolved. The situation was never satisfactorily 
remedied, however. During the three week trial defense counsel 
only managed to gain access to the Appellant on two overnight 
recesses. On those occasions they had to talk through several 
layers of mesh screen. Appellant was unable to handle documents, 
and it was virtually impossible to read anything through the mesh 
screens. This was prejudicial to Appellant's defense, because 
while in Cache County jail Appellant had indexed and made personal 
notes from pretrial hearing transcripts and discovery documents. 
When he was moved to Salt Lake County jail, Appellant was not 
allowed to keep these documents in his possession. Not being able 
to discuss these personal notations with his counsel made the notes 
much less valuable at trial. Objection was placed on the record 
by counsel, (p. 1374, 11. 4-10). 
Appellant's counsel needed to discuss these and other matters 
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during overnight recesses, because during daytime hours the trial 
did not leave sufficient time for consultation with Appellant. 
Counsel stayed in Salt Lake City from Monday through Thursday 
during the three weeks of trial, returning to Logan for the 
weekends. The denial of evening consultation effectively deprived 
Appellant of his constitutional right to counsel and the right to 
assist in his own defense. 
Telephone access was not a viable alternative because signs 
posted near the telephones in the jail stated that the lines were 
monitored. This prevented free and uninhibited communication 
between Appellant and his attorneys. This lack of privacy also 
violated Appellant's constitutional right of access to the courts. 
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right of access to 
the courts under the due process clause of the fifth amendment to 
the United States Constitution and as applied to the states through 
the fourteenth amendment. A criminal defendant also has a 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, as 
guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the federal Constitution and 
applied to the states by the fourteenth amendment. The Utah 
Constitution similarly guarantees the right of due process of law. 
The right of prisoners to access to the courts was first 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Ex parte Hull, 
312 U.S. 546 (1941). In Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971), 
the Court imposed an affirmative obligation on the states to 
provide prisoners with access to law libraries or legal assistance. 
In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977), the Court held that 
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access to the courts must be "adequate, effective, and meaningful." 
Many federal and state courts have formulated specific 
requirements of this constitutional guarantee. One important 
aspect of the guarantee of access to the courts is the "right to 
assist in [one's] own defense." Ferrell v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1128, 
1131 (5th Cir. 1978). In the instant case, Appellant was denied 
this right when he was not allowed to take into the Salt Lake 
County jail the materials he was personally compiling to aid in his 
defense. 
Such restrictions are especially suspect when applied to a 
person awaiting trial. As the Colorado Supreme Court has noted, 
persons . . . detained in jail awaiting trial on criminal 
charges . . . are persons who, under our American system 
of justice, are presumed to be innocent of any crime and 
who, if they had sufficient funds, would be free on bail 
enjoying freedom while awaiting trial. The sole purpose 
of their detention is to secure their presence at trial. 
Wesson v. Johnson, 579 P.2d 1165, 1166-67 (Colo. 1978) (footnote 
and citations omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court, in a case involving conditions in a 
county jail, has similarly affirmed the rights of detainees: 
Detainees do not, of course, possess the full rights of 
personal liberty enjoyed by persons not charged with a 
crime, but the conditions of confinement are not without 
some constitutional limitations and are limited to 
measures necessary to assure their appearance for trial 
and to maintain jail discipline and security. 
Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 901 (Utah 1981). 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a case involving 
searches of pre-trial detainees' mail and restrictions on visits 
by their attorneys, stated: "The presumptively innocent status of 
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these individuals requires even closer scrutiny of limitations on 
their fundamental rights and liberties than is warranted when the 
same restrictions are placed on convicted inmates." Taylor v. 
Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 470 fn. 11 (5th Cir. 1976). 
The Taylor court also stated: "Before procedures that impede 
a prisoner's access to the courts may be constitutionally 
validated, it must be clear that the state's substantial interests 
cannot be protected by less restrictive means." Id. at 472 
(footnote and citation omitted). The court further explained this 
standard as follows: 
The use of this relatively high standard of 
justification for restrictions on inmate access to the 
courts does not portend grave security risks in the 
prison environment. Jail security alone is 
unquestionably a substantial or compelling governmental 
interest. Whenever a jail practice or procedure furthers 
the interest of jail security in a manner that is 
necessary or essential to that interest, there is no 
constitutional violation. But we take the terms * 
"necessary" or "essential" to mean that there is no 
alternative means of protecting jail security that is 
reasonably available to prison officials. This is the 
least that should be required when a fundamental interest 
such as access to the courts is at stake. 
Id. at 472 fn. 14 (citation omitted). The court noted that "[t]he 
basic prisoner interest is in uninhibited communication with 
attorneys." Id. at 475. 
When a strict scrutiny analysis is applied in the instant 
case, it is apparent that Appellant's "fundamental interest" in 
access to his attorneys immediately before trial and during 
overnight recesses could have been protected without unreasonably 
risking security at the jail. The small extra expense or 
inconvenience that would have been necessary to provide such access 
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were not sufficient justifications for depriving Appellant of a 
fundamental right under the federal and state constitutions. 
In Via v. Cliff, 470 F.2d 274 (3rd Cir. 1972), the appellant 
alleged that six days before trial his consultation with counsel 
was interrupted after fifty minutes and then terminated by prison 
officials even though they were informed that his trial for felony-
murder was at hand. Also, on the second day of the trial, counsel 
was denied admission to the prison, although the trial judge had 
ordered prison officials to permit counsel to visit the prisoner 
at any time for any length of time. The Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated: "The most critical time for the exercise of the 
right to counsel in criminal defense is the days immediately before 
and during the trial. At such times, the right to counsel takes 
on special importance, and the Regulation' of the right by prison 
officials should be more restrained." Id. at 275. Although the 
appellant was seeking damages under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 rather than 
reversal, the court affirmed that if the appellant could "prove 
that the interference was either wrongfully motivated or without 
adequate justification . . . he will have established an 
infringement of his constitutional right to counsel . . . ." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
In the case at bar the denial of access to counsel occurred 
at the "most critical time" — immediately before trial — and 
several times during the trial period, rather than on only one 
occasion as in Via. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "the denial 
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of free and unfettered communication between inmates and courts and 
attorneys may constitute a denial of federal constitutional 
rights." Barlow v. Amiss, 477 F.2d 896, 898 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly stated: 
Citation of authority is hardly needed for the 
proposition that an inmate's right of unfettered access 
to the courts is as fundamental a right as any other he 
may hold. All other rights of an inmate are illusory 
without it, being entirely dependent for their existence 
on the whim or caprice of the prison warden. 
Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 1973) (citations 
omitted). 
Adams was an appeal by prisoners in a federal prison in which, 
after a riot had occurred during which prisoners set fires and were 
found to possess gunpowder, prison authorities confiscated legal 
papers along with other combustible materials from inmates' cells. 
The authorities also restricted access by lawyers. The visiting 
room was divided with soundproof glass; phones were provided for 
communication between lawyers and inmates. Written information 
could only be passed by having a guard take it out of the room and 
around the screen. 
The Seventh Circuit concluded that under the circumstances 
the partition arrangement did not threaten the fundamental interest 
of access to counsel since meetings were allowed and privacy was 
respected, but nevertheless the separation was invalid because the 
justifications for the barrier fell 
markedly short of stating a rational basis for its 
erection. To justify his impairment of communication 
between attorneys and inmates in the name of security, 
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a prison warden must come forward with facts which tend 
to support a reasonable suspicion not only that 
contraband is being smuggled to inmates in the face of 
established preventive measures, but that their attorneys 
are engaged in the smuggling. 
The court was disinclined to believe that attorneys posed such a 
threat and recognized "the constitutional importance of the 
business which an attorney typically conducts with an inmate." 
Adams at 631-32. 
As for the confiscation of legal materials from inmates' 
cells, the court affirmed that "vthe deprivation of materials 
necessary to afford reasonable access to the courts' was . . . a 
violation of due process." Adams at 633 (quoting Siaafus v. Brown. 
416 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1969)). The court reasoned that 
[i]t is one thing to allow an inmate limited though 
reasonable access to the prison library or to a jailhouse 
lawyer. Neither can practicably be retained in an 
inmate's cell, and neither are possessed by him. It is 
quite another matter to deprive an inmate of an 
opportunity to pore over a personal and unobtrusive 
collection of legal books and papers within the confines 
of his cell. . . . Legal materials should not be withheld 
on the dubious ground that they might serve as additional 
matter to burn during some future, though unanticipated, 
disturbance. 
Adams at 634. 
In the instant case, the Salt Lake County jail authorities 
certainly had no rational basis for believing that Appellant's 
attorneys posed a security threat, either as smugglers of 
contraband or otherwise. Nor did the "personal and unobtrusive" 
legal papers which Appellant desired to work with in his cell pose 
a threat of any kind. The restrictions imposed on Appellant were 
obviously designed only for the convenience of the jail 
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authorities, and thus did not outweigh Appellant's constitutional 
right to "unfettered access" to courts and counsel. 
The United States Supreme Court declared in Procunier v. 
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974), that "inmates must have a 
reasonable opportunity to seek and receive the assistance of 
attorneys. Regulations and practices that unjustifiably obstruct 
the availability of professional representation or other aspects 
of the right of access to the courts are invalid." In Procunier 
v. Martinez the Supreme Court affirmed a decision by a district 
court that a prison rule which denied access to prisoners by law 
students working for attorneys, while allowing access for law 
students involved in a school program, imposed a substantial and 
unjustified burden on the right of access to the courts. The Court 
adopted the lower court's reasoning that 
[t]he remoteness of many California penal institutions 
makes a personal visit to an inmate client a time-
consuming undertaking 
. . . . [T]he ban against the use of law students or 
other paraprofessionals for attorney client interviews 
would deter some lawyers from representing prisoners who 
could not afford to pay for their traveling time 
. . . . And those lawyers who agreed to do so would waste 
time that might be employed more efficaciously in working 
on the inmates' legal problems. 
Id. at 420. 
In the case at bar, under the rationale of Procunier v. 
Martinez, the prohibition of access in the evening while the trial 
was in progress was an invalid burden on the right of access. Even 
if access would have been granted during weekend recesses, it would 
have been an unreasonable burden on out-of-town attorneys to 
require them to spend yet another day away from their offices and 
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it "would waste time that might be employed more efficaciously in 
working on the inmates' legal problems." 
Telephone conversations could not compensate for the lack of 
access in the instant case. Besides the obvious inconvenience of 
planning strategy or analyzing documents over the telephone, signs 
were posted near the phones at the Salt Lake County jail indicating 
that calls were monitored. This invasion of attorney-client 
privilege would naturally stifle "free and unfettered 
communication." 
The California Supreme Court has noted that a "long line of 
cases firmly establishes the general principle that a prisoner has 
a right to consult with his attorney in absolute privacy, 
notwithstanding the legitimate interests of prison authorities in 
the administration of jails." In re Jordan, 500 P.2d 873, 879 
(Cal. 1972) (citations omitted). In another case the same court 
declared, "[W]e cannot accept the argument that the jail can defeat 
a detainee's right of privacy by posting a sign warning him of its 
intention to monitor conversations." De Lancie v. Superior Court, 
647 P.2d 142, 149 (Cal. 1982). 
In Keenan v. Petersen, 759 P.2d 1140 (Or. App. 1988), an 
Oregon court held that monitoring calls did not violate the 
prisoner's rights, but the regulation at issue allowed unmonitored 
calls when a prisoner had a court date within seventy-two hours and 
it required that monitoring be stopped any time a call appeared to 
be with an attorney. 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently declared: 
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"Detainees' right to counsel and due process can also be 
compromised by a lack of privacy in consultations with counsel." 
Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1052 (8th Cir. 1989). In 
Johnson-El jail regulations limited the number of phone calls an 
inmate could make and did not provide private conditions for 
meetings with attorneys. The court concluded that the alleged 
"phone restrictions, library restrictions and the lack of privacy 
for communications with attorneys, if true, are 
unconstitutional." Id. at 1053. 
In another recent case a federal court stated: "Pursuant to 
the fundamental right of access to courts, detainees have a right 
of access to writing materials." The court concluded that 
officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service had 
"violated detained plaintiff class members' right of access to 
courts by failing to provide . . . adequate access to writing 
materials, and . . . confiscating legal rights materials." INS 
also violated plaintiffs' "rights to effective representation of 
counsel by unduly restricting attorney and paralegal visitation, 
failing to provide private telephone and visitation facilities, 
and in some cases failing to provide adequate telephone access." 
Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1511 (CD. Cal. 
1988). 
Appellant in the case at bar suffered similar violations in 
the form of restrictions on attorney access, lack of private 
telephones, and the denial of the right to keep legal materials in 
his cell that would have assisted in his defense. 
43 
The seminal case in the United States Supreme Court concerning 
denial of a criminal defendant's access to his or her attorney 
during a trial recess was Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 
(1976). The trial judge in a drug offense prosecution had issued 
an order preventing the defendant from consulting with his attorney 
during a seventeen-hour overnight recess between the defendant's 
direct and cross-examination for the purpose of avoiding the 
possible improper influencing of defendant's testimony. The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the defendant 
failed to show that the order prejudiced his case. 
In a unanimous opinion the Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that "an order preventing petitioner from consulting his counsel 
xabout anything' during a 17-hour overnight recess between his 
direct and cross-examination impinged upon his right to the 
assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." Geders 
at 91. The Court did not consider the issue of whether the 
defendant was prejudiced, apparently presuming prejudice given the 
importance of the right of counsel. The Court explained the 
importance of the right of access to counsel as follows: 
The recess at issue was only one of many called during 
a trial that continued over 10 calendar days. But it was 
an overnight recess, 17 hours long. It is common 
practice during such recesses for an accused and counsel 
to discuss events of the day's trial. Such recesses are 
often times of intensive work, with tactical decisions 
to be made and strategies to be reviewed. The lawyer may 
need to obtain from his client information made relevant 
by the day's testimony, or he may need to pursue inquiry 
along lines not fully explored earlier. At the very 
least, the overnight recess during trial gives the 
defendant a chance to discuss with counsel the 
significance of the day's events. Our cases recognize 
that the role of counsel is important precisely because 
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ordinarily a defendant is ill-equipped to understand and 
deal with the trial process without a lawyer's guidance. 
Id. at 88. 
Appellant in the instant case needed — and was 
constitutionally entitled — to consult with his attorneys during 
recesses in his trial for precisely the reasons outlined by the 
Court above. He was denied the right to consult with counsel 
during overnight recesses not once, as was the defendant in Geders, 
but several times — in fact, on all but two evenings during a 
three week trial. 
Following Geders, every federal Court of Appeals that ruled 
on the issue of a recess of any length during which a defendant 
was barred from consultation with counsel by order of a court 
concluded that it was an impermissible denial of the constitutional 
right to counsel. There was, however, a split in the circuits as 
to whether such a violation should result in reversal even if 
prejudice was not alleged or demonstrated. Most courts "extended 
the per se reversal rule of Geders to cover lesser restrictions on 
consultation." Perry v. Leeke, 832 F.2d 837, 840 (4th Cir. 1987). 
For example, the Fourth Circuit stated that "the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel . . . is so fundamental that there should never 
occur any interference with it for any length of time, however 
brief, absent some compelling reason." United States v. Allen. 542 
F.2d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 1976). The Allen court also affirmed that 
a defendant need make no showing of prejudice to have his 
conviction reversed. Id. at 634. The District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals, following the reasoning in Geders. stated: 
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We hold that an order that denies a criminal defendant 
the right to consult with counsel during a substantial 
trial recess, even though limited to a discussion of 
testimony, is inconsistent with the sixth amendment of 
the Constitution. We also find that the harm caused by 
this violation is such that reversal is required without 
a showing of actual prejudice. 
Mudd v. United States, 798 F.2d 1509, 1510 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The 
court reasoned that 
[t]o require a showing of prejudice would not only burden 
one of the fundamental rights enjoyed by the accused, but 
also would create an unacceptable risk of infringing on 
the attorney-client privilege. The only way that a 
defendant could show prejudice would be to present 
evidence of what he and counsel discussed, what they were 
prevented from discussing, and how the order altered the 
preparation of his defense. Presumably the government 
would then be free to question defendant and counsel 
about the discussion that did take place, to see if 
defendant nevertheless received adequate assistance. 
We cannot accept a rule whereby private discussions 
between counsel and client could be exposed in order to 
let the government show that the accused's sixth 
amendment rights were not violated. 
Id. at 1513 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
In Perry v. Leeke, 832 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1987), however, the 
Fourth Circuit reevaluated its position in light of new Supreme 
Court decisions, and decided that the denial of consultation during 
a fifteen-minute recess between direct and cross-examination of the 
defendant was not per se reversible error but would be analyzed in 
accordance with the prejudice standard established in Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit, 
holding that a trial court's order denying a defendant the 
opportunity to confer with counsel during a brief recess while the 
defendant is on the witness stand does not violate the sixth 
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amendment right to counsel. The Court, however, reaffirmed its 
holding in Geders that such an order is unconstitutional if for a 
long period such as an overnight recess, and the Court asserted 
that a showing of prejudice is not required for reversal of such 
a sixth amendment violation. The Court's rationale for such a 
distinction between long and short recesses is as follows: 
[T]he normal consultation between attorney and client 
that occurs during an overnight recess would encompass 
matters that go beyond the content of the defendant's own 
testimony — matters that the defendant does have a 
constitutional right to discuss with his lawyer, such as 
the availability of other witnesses, trial tactics, or 
even the possibility of negotiating a plea bargain. It 
is the defendant's right to unrestricted access to his 
lawyer for advice on a variety of trial-related matters 
that is controlling in the context of a long recess. The 
fact that such discussions will inevitably include some 
consideration of the defendant's ongoing testimony does 
not compromise that basic right. But in a short recess 
in which it is appropriate to presume that nothing but 
the testimony will be discussed, the testifying defendant 
does not have a constitutional right to advice. 
Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. , 109 S. Ct. , 102 L. Ed. 2d 624, 
635-36 (1989) (emphasis added). 
In the case at bar, long, overnight recesses are at issue, 
for which the Supreme Court in Perry reaffirmed that per se 
reversal is the appropriate remedy. For the reasons cited in Mudd, 
supra. a requirement that prejudice be demonstrated would be 
inappropriate. 
The Geders-Perry line of cases dealt with violations of the 
right to counsel as the result of an order by the trial court. 
The Appellant in the case at bar, however, maintains that the 
result in his case was precisely the same: the jail denied him 
access to his attorneys immediately before trial and during long 
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overnight recesses; his attorneys objected to the trial judge; the 
trial judge said he would remedy the problem, but was unsuccessful 
in such efforts. The result would have been no different had the 
trial judge ordered the restrictions on Appellant's access to his 
lawyers. At any rate, cases such as Taylor. Via, Barlow, Adams and 
Procunier v. Martinez, supra, establish that a pre-trial detainee 
is also deprived of his constitutional right to counsel and access 
to the courts by unjustified jail regulations. 
The denial of Appellant's access to his attorneys immediately 
before trial and during overnight recesses violated his due process 
right of access to the courts and his sixth amendment right to 
counsel. The conviction should therefore be reversed and remanded 
for a new trial with no showing of prejudice required. 
V. 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY REFUSING TO GIVE CERTAIN 
INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT REGARDING CIRCUMSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
The State's proof in the case was based entirely on 
circumstantial evidence except for the dubious evidence of an 
admission by the defendant to a jail cellmate (which was later 
admitted to another inmate to be perjury). (See argument of 
prosecutor, p. 1319, 11. 14-16). The circumstantial evidence 
primarily concentrated on the concepts of motive and opportunity 
(Argument of prosecutor, P. 1319, 11. 6-13). 
The defendant denied the charge, alleging that the baby had 
in fact been kidnapped from his parked vehicle, that despite a few 
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incidents showing that he was not as careful with his son as he 
should be, that he loved his son, was extremely proud of him, was 
concerned that Victoria was overly or "Mexican" mothering the child 
at the expense of herself and their relationship, and presented the 
possibility that the disappearance of the child was related to a 
substantial drug debt that he owed to suppliers of Victoria's 
brother-in-law in Phoenix, and that a suspicious late-model 
Cadillac, seen by a neighbor of James in the vicinity may have been 
linked to the same. 
The defendant submitted separately and as part of the 
instruction on reasonable doubt, a paragraph as to the law 
regarding circumstantial evidence which is susceptible to more than 
one reasonable interpretation. (Court Record, pp. 964-965, 975). 
(Exhibits G and H). This the Court refused to do, gave an 
inadequate instruction on direct and circumstantial evidence, (Ct. 
Record, 1018) (Exhibit I), and defendant's objection was noted, 
(pp. 1372-1373, 11. 17-14). (Transcript incorrectly attributes 
objection to Mr. Jenkins). 
The defendant's request was for an instruction on the basic 
law of circumstantial evidence. That law has been recently 
restated in State v. Watts, 675 ).2d 566. 
Circumstantial evidence alone may be competent to 
establish the guilt of the accused, so long as it 
excludes every reasonable hypothesis other than the 
defendant's guilt. [Emphasis added] 
at 569 citing State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723 (1982); State v. John. 
586 P.2d 410 (1978); State v. Schad, 470 P.2d 246 (1970). 
Where the prosecution's theory depended so heavily on 
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circumstantial evidence of motive and opportunity and other 
reasonable possibilities existed, the defendant was entitled to the 
requested instructions, 
VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT APPELLANT A NEW 
TRIAL ON THE GROUND OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. 
Appellant moved for a new trial based on two significant 
pieces of evidence that came to light after trial. 
First, the automobile from which Appellant maintains that his 
child was kidnapped was not able to be located before the trial was 
over. At trial the State made an issue of whether the door locks 
were in the locked or unlocked position. After the car was 
located, the new owner confirmed Appellant's testimony about the 
locks, thus refuting a police officer's testimony. (Ct. Record, 
1240-1246, 1287-1296) (Exhibit J). 
Second, a witness fortuitously came forward after the trial 
and made it known that a key witness for the prosecution had 
fabricated his testimony in an attempt to get better treatment from 
the State in his own criminal trial. (Exhibit K). 
The standard of review for reversing a denial of a motion for 
new trial is clear abuse of discretion. State v. Williams, 712 
P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985). This is a high standard, but in 
appropriate cases this court should not hesitate to reverse a trial 
court in the interest of justice. This court has stated that the 
denial of a motion for a new trial is abuse of discretion "where 
there is a grave suspicion that justice may have been miscarried 
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because of the lack of enlightenment on a vital point, which the 
new evidence will supply; and the other elements attendant on 
obtaining a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence 
are present." State v. Harris, 513 P.2d 438, 439-40 (Utah 1973) 
(emphasis added). 
The requirements which must be met for newly discovered 
evidence to be a ground for a new trial have been described as 
follows: "(1) It must be such as could not with reasonable 
diligence have been discovered and produced at the trial; (2) it 
must not be merely cumulative; (3) it must be such as to render a 
different result probable on the retrial of the case." State v. 
Gellatlv, 449 P.2d 993, 996 (Utah 1969) (footnote omitted). 
The third element of this test has, however, been modified in 
many jurisdictions in instances where new evidence indicates that 
a prosecution witness testified falsely. The federal courts are 
split, some circuits following the older "Berry" standard, from 
Berry v. State. 10 Ga. 511 (Ga. 1851), which requires that the 
newly discovered evidence be such that it would "probably" change 
the result; other circuits have adopted the so-called the 
"Larrison" standard, from Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 
(7th Cir. 1928), which requires only that without the false 
testimony the jury "might" have reached a different conclusion. 
This standard has been explained as "more than a faint possibility 
of a different jury verdict but something less than probability." 
United States v. Wallace, 528 F.2d 863, 866 fn. 3 (6th Cir. 1975). 
When "the movant's allegations involve an allegation of corruption 
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of the truth-seeking function of the trial process" the appropriate 
standard has been described as "any reasonable likelihood that the 
false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury," 
United States v. Runcre, 593 F.2d 66, 75 
(8th Cir. 1979) (Heaney, partial dissent) (citing United States v. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). 
Appellant maintains that this court should adopt the Larrison 
standard in a case such as his in which the testimony of two key 
prosecution witnesses could well be viewed as false testimony by 
a jury in light of newly discovered evidence. This would be 
consistent with the language from Harris, supra, indicating that 
a new trial should be granted if "justice may have been 
miscarried." 
Many state courts have adopted a "might" or "possibility" 
standard with respect to the likelihood of a different outcome at 
trial with new evidence. For example, in a case where a deal had 
been made by the prosecution in exchange for certain testimony, 
the Colorado Supreme Court reversed a denial of a motion for a new 
trial, stating, "Where newly discovered evidence is of such a 
character as to make it appear that the verdict could have been 
influenced by false or mistaken testimony and that upon another 
trial the result might be different, then a new trial should be 
granted." DeLuzio v. People, 494 P.2d 589, 592 (Colo. 1972) 
(emphasis added). 
The New Mexico Supreme Court similarly found that a trial 
court abused its discretion when it denied a motion for a new trial 
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where another individual confessed to the crime and where a witness 
to the crime filed an affidavit stating that he would have 
testified for the defense, but did not appear because of confusion 
as to the trial date. The court stated, "The new testimony is 
material and goes to the merits of the case. At another trial, 
this new evidence might produce an opposite result before a jury. 
Another jury should have the benefit of all the facts in order to 
arrive at a fair decision." State v. Chavez, 528 P.2d 897, 899 
(N.M. 1974) (emphasis added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court held that a trial court abused its 
discretion when it denied a motion for a new trial where the trial 
court decided that testimony of additional witnesses of an accident 
who viewed the accident from a different angle and who came forward 
after the trial was merely cumulative. The court asserted that 
"their affidavits supply independent circumstances which might very 
well influence the minds of the jurors." Brown v. Graham, 112 P.2d 
485, 493 (Idaho 1941). 
In a particularly pertinent case, the California Supreme Court 
held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion 
for a new trial based upon the affidavit of a witness whom the 
defendant had assumed to be hostile and hence did not call as a 
witness at trial, but who later stated that the grounds for 
conviction were fabricated by the prosecution's main witness. The 
court conceded that the defendant had known of this witness at the 
time of trial, and so it was not newly discovered evidence in the 
strict sense of the term, and with reasonable effort the defendant 
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could have presented the evidence at trial, but the court also 
recognized that 
"despite the exercise of such effort, cases will 
sometimes occur where, after trial, new evidence most 
material to the issues, and which would probably have 
produced a different result is discovered. It is for 
such cases that the remedy of a motion for a new trial 
on the ground of newly discovered evidence has been 
given." 
People v. Williams, 368 P.2d 353, 359 (Cal. 1962) (quoting People 
v. Fong Shee Shunq, 109 P.2d 974, 976). The court also explained 
that !l[t]he term "diligence' is "incapable of exact definition 
because it is a relative term' and the "diligence' of defendant in 
marshalling his evidence for the trial must be determined in the 
light of the "peculiar circumstances' involved." Williams at 359 
(citations omitted). Thus the court found that the defendant was 
entitled to a new trial even though the "new" witness's "assumed 
unfriendly attitude toward him deterred him from attempting any 
interview with her or even mentioning her presence to his 
attorney." Id. The court quoted with approval the statement, 
""For a guilty man to escape punishment is a miscarriage of 
justice, but for an innocent man to be convicted is unthinkable.'" 
Id. at 360 (quoting People v. Reed, 81 P.2d 162, 167). 
In the instant case, the last witness called by the 
prosecution was Ronald Peterson, who testified that he had 
overheard a conversation between Appellant and Jon Lippencott while 
in Cache County jail in which Appellant admitted his guilt to 
Lippencott. This was in fact the only direct evidence of 
Appellant's guilt presented by the prosecution. Appellant denied 
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under oath ever having had such a conversation. After the trial, 
a former cellmate of Peterson at the Utah State Prison, Kenneth 
Lisner, made it known that Peterson had told him that Peterson had 
seen a "60 Minutes" program on TV about an individual in California 
who gave false testimony in exchange for favors from the 
prosecution and that Peterson had tried to do the same thing by 
fabricating false testimony about the Appellant in this case. 
Lisner says that he made a note to himself to make this information 
known when he was released from prison, but then when Appellant 
happened to be placed in the same block, he told Appellant what he 
had heard from Peterson. 
Appellant moved for a new trial on the ground of this newly 
discovered evidence. The trial court, however, denied the motion, 
finding that the proposed testimony and affidavit of Lisner failed 
to qualify on all three criteria from Gellatly, supra. 
The trial court found that with due diligence the Appellant 
could have discovered this testimony before trial. Appellant 
maintains that this was error. It was Appellant's counsel's 
understanding that Peterson had shared cells with fifty to one 
hundred people at the state prison since he claimed to have 
overheard the incriminating conversation between Appellant and 
Lippencott. 
(T.[4/17/90] 11.) To interview every person with whom Peterson 
had come into contact would have been almost impossible, akin to 
proving a negative. Thus it was not from a lack of due diligence 
that Appellant failed to discover this testimony contradicting 
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Peterson. 
The trial court also found that this evidence was merely 
cumulative. Since Appellant contradicted Peterson on this point 
in his testimony at trial, the court concluded that Lisner would 
simply be saying something the jury had already heard from 
Appellant. The trial court accepted the State's argument that 
"what we have is Mr. Lisner's word now against Ron Peterson's word. 
That's no different than Ron Peterson's word against the 
defendant's word at trial." (T.[4/5/90] 12.) Actually, there is 
an immense difference. Appellant would naturally be expected to 
contradict such testimony, since he has consistently maintained 
his complete innocence. Jurors would expect him to deny such 
admissions. But to hear such a cogent and damning explanation for 
Peterson's testimony from a disinterested person would have an 
entirely different effect. It is somewhat specious to call such 
evidence "cumulative" given the different quality of such testimony 
from the viewpoint of a juror. The Idaho Court of Appeals examined 
a similar situation in State v. Ames, 730 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Idaho 
App. 1986), and concluded: "Although the testimony arguably would 
be vcumulative' insofar as it would corroborate [defendant's] own 
story, it is not ^merely' cumulative. It adds substantially to 
[defendant's] defense by presenting independent evidence . . . ." 
The trial court also found that Lisner's testimony would not 
have changed the result of the trial. That is very debateable. 
Appellant maintains that it "probably" would have changed the 
outcome. The only evidence of his guilt up to Peterson's testimony 
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was purely circumstantial. It is perfectly reasonable to believe 
that jurors were not sure of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
until Peterson, the last witness called by the prosecution, 
testified that he had overheard Appellant's confession. Such 
testimony, if believed, would have been very powerful evidence for 
an otherwise uncertain juror. 
Appellant further maintains that the "possibility" standard 
from Larrison, supra. is the standard that should be applied to 
this prong of the test, especially since the new evidence indicates 
fabricated testimony on the part of prosecution witnesses. Utah 
appellate courts seem to have embraced this "possibility" standard. 
In State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929, (Utah App. 1989), the Court of 
Appeals stated: "Defendant must also establish that the newly 
discovered evidence is material in the sense that it might have 
affected the outcome of the trial." Id. at 932 (emphasis added) 
(citing State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 851 (Utah 1988)). 
Appellant in the instant case argued at the hearing on the 
motion for a new trial that the trial court should adopt this 
"possibility" standard (T.[4/5/90] 3), but the trial court seems 
not to have accepted the new standard. The court stated: 
The defendant, in the Court's opinion, was not 
convicted on the testimony of Ronald Peterson. The 
defendant was convicted on an exceptionally strong 
circumstantial evidence case. . . . the Court agrees 
totally and completely with the jury verdict rendered in 
this case, and is absolutely of the opinion that the 
outcome of this case would not have been any different 
whether Ron Peterson testified or not. 
(T.[4/17/90] 16.) 
Actually, there was not a shred of evidence presented at trial 
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to show the "intentional or knowing" mental state necessary for the 
jury to find Appellant guilty of first degree murder. In fact it 
was not a strong circumstantial case at all, and it was an abuse 
of discretion for the trial judge to deny that the newly discovered 
evidence "might have affected the outcome," the standard set forth 
in State v. Smith, supra. 
At the hearing on the motion for a new trial on the ground of 
new evidence based on Lisner's affidavit, the State also made an 
issue of why Appellant had failed to call Lippencott, a former jail 
cellmate of Appellant, to whom Peterson claimed the statements were 
made, as a witness at his trial to refute Peterson. (T. [4/5/90] 
18.) This was somewhat hypocritical, since Lippencott would also 
have been a more natural witness for the prosecution to use to 
establish what Appellant supposedly told Lippencott than was 
Peterson, a jailhouse informant who merely claimed to have 
overheard the conversation, although no one else in the cell 
overheard such a conversation. Had the State called Lippencott, 
the whole issue of whether or not Peterson was fabricating 
testimony merely in the hope of cutting a deal for himself could 
have been avoided. As the Colorado Supreme Court recognized in 
DeLuzio, supra, "the primary duty of a district attorney is not to 
convict, but to see that justice is done." DeLuzio at 593 
(citations omitted). The interests of justice would have been 
better served had the State called Lippencott rather than calling 
a hearsay witness who claimed to have overheard a conversation in 
the next cell. 
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Lippencott told Appellant's attorney some months before trial 
that he had never had the alleged conversation with Appellant. 
Then Lippencott moved to California and counsel were unable to 
locate him again until the day before trial. At that time 
Lippencott told counsel over the telephone that he was on 
probation, was doing well, and had a new job which he would lose 
if he had to return to Utah to testify. He said that he would 
"fuck over" whichever side subpoenaed him. (T. [4/5/90] 19.) Given 
this hostile attitude, the defense made the decision not to call 
him as a witness, fearing that he would carry out his threat and 
provide very damaging testimony — although untrue by his own 
former admission. After Appellant's counsel contacted Lippencott 
the day before trial, even if the court had subpoenaed him as a 
supposedly neutral witness for the court, there can be no doubt 
but what Lippencott would have known that it was at the request of 
the defense, and carried out his threat. 
In the hearing on the motion for new trial, the court became 
obsessed with this threat. The judge kept misconstruing the issue 
as one of whether or not the court would have had the power to 
bring Lippencott into court and force him to testify, when the real 
issue was whether or not Lippencott could be made to tell the 
truth. Appellant's counsel tried to focus on the real issue 
without success. For example: 
THE COURT: Well, the Court would not have trembled in 
fear of the defendant's threat, had you approached the 
Court. The Court would have used every means provided 
by the law. 
MR. HULT: We weren't afraid the Court wouldn't get him 
up here. We were afraid what he would do once he came 
59 
up here, in the Court. 
THE COURT: That certainly is a problem the Court 
theoretically has to deal with every day. The Court 
certainly would not have been reluctant in any way to 
compel the attendance of a witness that you wanted to 
bring into court. 
(T.[4/5/90] 19.) 
THE COURT: . . . Lippencott who threatened the whole 
State of Utah if you brought him to testify. 
MR. GUTKE: I think he threatened not to testify 
truthfully. 
(T.[4/5/90] 31.) 
MR. HULT: [W]e ask . . . that the Court look and 
recognize that it is the fact of Kenneth Lisner that is 
the newly discovered evidence in this case, and the 
critical evidence. 
(T.[4/5/90] 12.) 
THE COURT: The Court concludes . . . that this Court has 
absolutely no reasonable assurance that Mr. Lippencott 
will ever voluntarily or involuntarily step foot into the 
State of Utah again . . . . this Court has absolutely no 
indication that if and when Mr. Lippencott should ever 
come back to the State of Utah he would say anything that 
would contradict Mr. Peterson's testimony. The Court 
finds that this man, at very best, could be 
complimentarily characterized as an unreliable, 
shiftless, drug-abusing, phantom fugitive, at very best. 
(T.[4/5/90] 14.) 
Appellant has no quarrel with the trial court's 
characterization of Lippencott. Appellant maintains that at a new 
trial, with Lisner's testimony, it would be apparent that Peterson 
was at least as unreliable. Peterson committed calculated perjury 
in an effort to get a deal for himself. Lisner's allegation has 
a ring of truth that might very well cause jurors to doubt the 
veracity of Peterson. A frustration of justice at the motion for 
new trial resulted from the court changing the focus from Lisner 
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to Lippencott. This refusal to focus on the newly discovered 
evidence in the form of Lisner's affidavit, and the incorrect 
characterization of that evidence as discoverable before trial, 
merely cumulative, and not of crucial importance was an abuse of 
discretion. 
In the State's testimony at the hearing for a new trial on 
this issue, and in the court's findings, an implicit distrust of 
prisoner testimony emerges. For example, the court concluded that 
allowing Lisner's testimony "would result in nothing more than a 
push and pull match between prisoners. Yes, you did. No, I 
didn't. And that verbal tug-of-war could endure indefinitely." 
(T.[4/17/90] 15.) Appellant does not deny the problematic nature 
of testimony by jailhouse informants, but it is unfair for the 
State to get its "push" and then deny Appellant his "pull." 
Appellant did not seek out dubious prisoner testimony for this 
purpose, but when very credible evidence fortuitously came to light 
that could very well change the outcome, it would be unfair not to 
allow a new trial just because the new testimony is from a 
prisoner, when it was prisoner testimony that convicted Appellant 
in the first place. 
It is often stated that new evidence that is merely impeaching 
cannot be the basis for a new trial. In the instant case, however, 
the newly discovered evidence is not merely impeaching. It reveals 
an attempt on the part of Ronald Peterson to purposely corrupt the 
truth-seeking function of the trial process for his own ends. 
The other ground on which Appellant moved for a new trial, 
61 
and on which he maintains that the trial court abused its 
discretion in its denial of the motion, was based on the affidavit 
of the new owner of the automobile from which the child was 
kidnapped. Admittedly, whether the doors were locked when the 
police arrived seems not to be a crucial issue. But in a trial 
where the only direct evidence was perjured testimony by a 
jailhouse informant, the defendant is seriously damaged by 
seemingly small bits of circumstantial evidence. The State 
introduced photographs of the door locks as exhibits, and a police 
officer testified that the door was locked when the plunger was in 
the position shown in the photographs. Appellant denied that fact. 
Appellant's counsel diligently tried to find the car before 
trial, but without success. (R. 1287-94.) When the car was 
located after trial, the new owner stated in an affidavit that for 
the door to be locked, the plunger had to be down flush, not 
slightly up as in the photographs. This corroborated Appellant's 
testimony and showed the police officer's testimony to be false. 
At a hearing on the motion for a new trial, the court ruled 
that this was not newly discovered evidence, because with due 
diligence Appellant could have found the car before trial. This 
was error. Appellant's counsel did exercise due diligence, as was 
demonstrated by affidavits and testimony. The car could not be 
found before trial even with the help of the Logan Police 
Department. (R. 1333.) The court also ruled that it was not 
crucial evidence. (T.[7/26/89] 11.) In reality, as has been 
pointed out above, it was evidence without which Appellant was at 
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a disadvantage at trial, and with this evidence in a new trial the 
outcome might well be different. Thus it was an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to deny the motion for a new trial 
on this ground also. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should find that evidence was insufficient to 
sustain a conviction of Criminal Homicide Murder in the First 
Degree and requires dismissal, or alternatively, the court should 
reverse and remand for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this Q / day of August, 1990. 
Robert W. Gutke 
Nathan H u l t " 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered four (4) copies of the 
above and foregoing BRIEF to counsel for the Plaintiff/Appellee, 
R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, on the 3 I day of August, 
1990. 
Robert W. Gutke (] C 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A Requested Questions For Submission To Jury Venue On 
Voir Dire Examination 
Exhibit B Motion For Individual, Sequestered Voir Dire 
Examination 
Exhibit C Objection To Voir Dire Of Jury Panel And Defendant's 
Being Compelled To Prematurely Exercise Peremptory 
Challenges 
Exhibit D Motion To Suppress Any Reference To Defendant's 
California Conviction 
Exhibit E Motion For Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict 
Exhibit F Motion To Record Defendant's Conviction For Next 
Lower Category Of Offense 
Exhibit G Defendant's Requested Jury Instruction - Reasonable 
Doubt And Circumstantial Evidence 
Exhibit H Defendant's Requested Jury Instruction 
Circumstantial Evidence 
Exhibit I Court's Instruction - Direct And Circumstantial 
Evidence 
Exhibit J Motion For New Trial - Car Located Showing Driver's 
Door Unlocked At Time Of Abduction 
Exhibit K Motion For New Trial - Statement Of State Witness 
Ron Peterson To Kenneth Lisner Admitting Perjury 
EXHIBIT A 
MAY 1 7 1989 
IM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE ' OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOV; the above named Defendant, by and through his 
counsel of record and submits the following series of questions 
to be asked of the venire by the trial judge during the voir dire 
examination in conjunction with a a jury questionnaire previously 
submitted to counsel by the court which the court, indicated would 
form the basis of the court's inquiry with the panel. A copy of 
the jury questionnaire received from the court is attached hereto 
as exhibit "A" and by this reference is incorporated herein. 
Defendant reserves the right to rubini t additional questions 
during voir dire examination. Defendant respectfully prays that: 
the following be asked of the venire: 
mw? 
Robert W. Gutke - 1281 
Attorney for Defendant 
13 2 North Main 
Logan, Utah S.4 3 21 
Telephone: (HOI) 753-7400 
Nathan Hult - 4704 
Attorney for Defendant 
325 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 1/1 
Logan, Utah 84 3 21 
Telephone: (801) 753-3391 
REQUESTED QUEST TOMS FOE 
SUEMISSIO'T TO JURY VEHIEE 
Of' VOTE DTEE EXAM I EAT TOM 
Case Me. Cft^ 5*17 
HOHOEAELE PAT D. DP JAM 
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1. Assuming that the court will ask those 
forth in the attached juror questionnaire, the 
Defendant requests that [allowing question G e 
questionnaire the following questions be askco: 
(a). Are yon using any (a). Yes 
prescription medications that 
have an effect on your ability 
to concentrate or sit for long 
periods of time? 
(b). Do you suffer from any (b). Yes 
medical or physical condition 
that would make it uncomfortable 
for you to sit, listen and 
concentrate for extended periods 
ot tlmc? 
(c). Do you have any medical (c). Yes 
condition that the court should 
know about if you are selected 
as a juror in this case (e.g. 
diabetes, heart ailment, high blood 
pressure, etc.). If your answer is 
yes, please explain. 
2. Following question fl, the following: 
(a) . Address: (a) . 
(b). How long have you lived (b). 
at that adoress? 
(c) . Where where you born? (c) . 
(d) . Where else have you lived? (d) . 
(e). Are you a member of the (e). Yes 
LDS church? 
(f). Are you active in the LDS (f). Yes 
church? 
(g) . If you are not a member of (q) . 
the LDS church, whnf il ;iny ir 
your r e1i g i o u s affiliation? 
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(h) . Arc you active in your (h) 
church? 
(i). What position or positions (i) 
it any do you hold in your church? 
(j). What, if any social (j) 
organizations do you belong to? 
(k). What positions, if any do (k) 
you hold in your social organization? 
(1). What hobbies or Leisure (1) 
time activities do you participate 
in? 
(m) . What hobbies or leisure1 (m) 
time activities does your spouse 
participate in? 
(n). Have you been involved (n) 
with any groups whose goals are 
to make changes in the criminal 
justice system? If so, what 
group? What is your involvement? 
(o) . Have you ever belonged to (o) 
any organization whose goal is to 
stop or reduce- crime? Tf so, what: 




(p). Aside from the political 
party you identify with, if any, 
how would you describe your 
political views? 
(p)• Liberal 
Somewha t Li ber a 1 
n om e \ / ha t Cons e rvati v e 
Conservetlve 
Do you vote regularly* 
Following paragraph ~ 
Spcuse's name? 
Spouse ' S' Age? 












( C ) . 
Yes No 
(d; 
A. Following paragraph 9, the following: 
(a) What schools do they (a), 
attend? 
5* Following paragraph 11 , the following 
(a). Name and location of the (a). 
high school from which you 
graduated? 
(b). Year you graduated. 
(c). If you didn't graduate 
from high school, what: is the 
highest level of education you 
completed? 
: b ) . 
: c ) . 
(d) Where? (c) . 
6« Following paragraph 12, the following 
(a). Have you attended a college (a) 
or university? 
(b). Which college or 
universi ty? 
(b) 
(c) • College major? (c) . 
7* Following paragraph 14, the following 
(a)• Have you served on active (a) 
duty or in the reserve forces cf 
any branch ol the military? 
(b) . If yen, what branch anrl (b) 
how long were you on active duty? 
(c) Did your military service (c). 
result from a voluntary enlistment 
or from having been crafted? 
(d). What was your highest rank (d). 
or grade? 
(e). Did you serve as a military (e). 
policeman or a member ot the provost 
marshal!s office? 
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(f). Did you receive an (f). 
honorable discharge? 
8. Follov;ing question 15, the following: 
(a) . [low long with that (a) . 
employer? 
(b). What is your business (b). 
address? 
(c). Do you supervise or manage (c). Ye 
others as part of employment? 
9. Following paragraph 16, the following: 
(a). What is your spouse's (a), 
occupation? 
(b) . What is your spouse's (b) . 
business address? 
10. Fol lowing question .19, the following: 
(a). Do you have any negative (a). Y 
feelings towards anyone as a 
result of your involvement in a 
civil case? 
(b). Do you have any negative (b). Y 
feelings towards the legal system, 
the participants or the process 
.generally as a result of your 
involvement in a civil case? 
11. Following paragraph 24, the following: 
(a). Do you have any negative (a). Y 
feelings towards anyone as a 
result of that experience? 
(b) . Do you feel any resentment (b) . Y 
towards the legal system, the 
participants or the process 
generally as a result of your 
experience? 
12. Following question 25, the fol lev-zing : 
(a) . Pel ationship? (a) . 
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13. Following question 29, the following 
(a). Do you have negative 
feeling towards anyone as a 
result of your relative's 
experience with the criminal 
justice system? 
(b). Do you have any negative 
feelings towards the legal system, 
the participants or the process 
generally as a result of your 
relative's experience with the 
criminal system? 
(c). Has any close acquaintance 
ever been arrested? 









(e). Was that person ever 
charged with a crime? 
(f). What crime? 
(g). What was the outcome? 
(h). Do you have any negative 
feelings towards the legal system, 
the participants or the process 
generally as a result of what you 
know about that person's experience 
with the criminal justice system? 
14. Following question 33, the following: 
(a). Was anyone charged with (a). 
the crime? 
(b). Was there a trial? (b). 
(c) . What was the outcome? (c) . 
(d). Do you have any negative (d). 
feelings towards anyone as a 
result of your being the victim 
of cr inie? 
(e) . Do you have any negative (e) . 
feelings towards the legal system, 
the participants or the process 
generally as a result: of' your 
beinq the victim of a crime? 















15. Following question 39, the following: 
(a). Do you have any negative (a) 
feelings towards anyone as a 
result of your family member being 
the victim of a crime? 
(b)• Do you feel resentment (b) 
towards the legal system, the 
participants or the process 
generally as a result ot your 
family member being the victim 
of a crime? 
(c). Has anyone with whom you (r) 
have been closely acquainted ever 
been the victim of a crime? 
(d). When? (d) 
(e). What crime? (e) 
'(f). :>1as anyone ever charger: (f) 
with the cr ime? 
(g) . Was there a trial? (g) 
(h) . What was the outcome? (h) 
(i). Do you have any negative (i) 
feelings towards anyone as a 
result of that person being the 
victim of a crime? 
(j). Do you have any negative (j) 
feelings towards the legal system, 
the participants or the process 
generally as a result of that 












16. Following question 42, the following 
(a) . Was anyone ever charged (a) . 
with the crime? 
(b) Was there a trial? 










(d) . What was the outcome? (d] 
(e). Do you have any negative 
feelings towards anyone as a 
result of your being a witness 
to a crime? 
(G) Yes Ho 
(f). Do you have any negative 
feelings towards the legal systt 
the participants or the process 
generally as a result of your 
being a witness to a crime? 







Nov; and then 
Once a week 
Regularly 
Cvery day 
(h). Do you believe that , 
person is less likely to be 
lav; abiding if they consume 
alcohol? 
>0 Yes No 
(i). Do you have strong 
feelings about the consumption 
of alcohol? If so, what are 
those feelings? 
(j). Do you believe that a 
person is less likely to be 
law abiding if he or she uses 
drugs? 
(k). Do you believe that a 
person who has used drugs is 
generally more violent then a 
person who has never consumed 
drugs? 
(1). Are you personally 
acquainted with anyone who 









(m)• Do you believe that a 
person who has used drugs is 
generally more likely to be 
violent than a person never 
involved in drugs? 
(m) Yes '•Jo 
17, Following question 44, the following: 
(a). Have you ever been called (a). Ye 
to serve on a jury? 
IS. Following question AG, the following: 
a) What was the outcome? 
(b). Do you have any negative 
feelings towards anyone as a 
result of your being a juror 
in a criminal case? 
(c) . Do you have any negative 
feelings towards the legal system, 
its participants or the process 
as a result of your involvement as 




19 lowing question 47, the fo11ow i i \g 
(a) . (a)a. Do you have relatives who 
work for a lav; enforcement agency 
(e.g. sheriff, police, FHI, etc.)? 
(b). What agency? 
(c). What is that person's name? 
(a). Do you work for any K-,w 
enforcement agency or security 
company on a lull-time or part-time 
basis or have you in the past? 
(e). What is the name of the 







(f). What is the person's name? 
(g) . Do you have any relatives 
or close acquaintances who work 
for attorneys? 
(h) . What is that person's name'. 
(i). What is your relationship? 






(k). What is the name oi the 
firm or the name and loeation of 
the firm or governmental agency? 
(1). How do you feel about 
attorneys? 
(m). How do ycu feel about 
prosecutors? 
20. Please road through the 
asking the questions designated 1 
'like Vaughan 
Dennis Simonson 
Cra ig Andrews 













Roy James, Jr. 
Art Flandro 
00 • 
(1) . _ _ 
(m) • 
following list of names before 
tne following subparagraphs. 
Marthan Ferguson 



















Dr. Kent Glanville 
Jeanotte Hobbs 
Ben and Mary Ann Golightly 









(a). Have you had any personal (a) 
contact with anyone listed above? 
If you have please circle the 
name or names and place the number 
1 beside each circle. 
(b). Do you have any negative (b) 
feelings towards any person you 
have identified? If so, which 
person(s)? 
(c)• Do you have any positive (c) 
feelings towards any person you 
have identified? If so, which 
person (s)? 
(d) . Have you had any business (ci) 
dealings or professional dealings 
with any person listed above? If 
you have please circle the name or 
names and place the number 2 next 
to each circle* 
(e). Do you have any negative (e) 
feelings towards any of the people 
you have identified? If so, which 
person(s)? 
(t). Do you have any positive (if) 
feelings towards any of the people 
you have identified? If so, 
which person(s)? 
(g). Are you otherwise (g) 
acquainted with anyone listed 
above? If you are please circle 
the name or names and place the 
number 3 next to each circle, 
(h). Do you have any negative (h) 
or positive feelings towards any 
of the people you have identified? 
(i). Do you feel that you (1) 
would be inclined to believe 
the testimony of a law enforcement 
agent simply becauso he is a law 
enforcement agent ? 
(j) . Do you feel that you would (j) 
be less inclined to believe the 
testimony ot a law enforcement 








(k). Do you feel that you would (k) 
be more inclined to believe the 
testimony or statement of a person 
accused ot a crime because he has 
been charged with a crime? 
(1). Do you feel that you would (1) 
be less inclined to believe the 
statement or testimony of a person 
accused ot a crime simply because 
he has been charged with a crime? 
.'GS Mo 
Yes Mo 
21, Prior to question 50, the following 
(a). Do you read newspapers, (a). 
magazines, books or other 
periodic publications? 
(b) . Do ycu read such -materials on a 
daily basis? _ Only occasionally? 
or rarely, if at all? 
Yes Me 
(c). If you are a reader of the 
newspaper, to which part or parts 
of the paper do you pay particuJar 
attention? (Please circle) 










(d). Please list the last five 
(5) books you have read. 
(a) 
(e)• Do you read the Salt Lake 
Tribune? 
:o) Yes rio 
(f) . Do you read the Dcseret 
Mews? 
U") Yos no 
(g) . What other newspapers, if 
any, do you read? 
:g) . 
(h). Do you listen to radio, 
If so, which stations? 
h) Yes No 
(1). What magazines, if any, 
do you read? 
i) 
(j)« What sort of television 
programming do you prefer to 
watch (for example, news, sports, 
dramas, etc.)? 
o> . 
(k). Do you believe that most 
of what you read in the newspapers 
is accurate, or true? Please 
explain your answer. 
(1). Do you believe that most 
of what you hear on the teLev is ion 
or radio is accurate, or true? 
Please explain your answer. 
(k) :es Mo 
(] ' No 
(m). Do you primarily rely on 
television, radio or newspaper 
for news reports? 
(n). Have you read, seen or 
heard any news reports or articles 
or information related to the 
incident which occurred August 26, 
1986, in Logan, Utah, that being 
the disappearance of a three month 
old infant from a shopping center 
parking lot? 
read , seen or 
a r t i c 1 e s 
(o). Have you 
heard any news reports or 
related to the preliminary hearing 
in this case which took place in 
Logan in December, 1986? 
(P)• Do you have any negative 
feelings towards any person as 
a result of what you have heard, 
read or seen in the news media 
about the incident in Logan, Utah.? 
(rc) 
(n) 




(o) Yes Mo 
(P) Yes No 
(q). Have you heard or are you 
familiar with or have you been 
told statements allegedly made by 
Steven Ray James since August 26, 1936? 
q) Yes Mo 
(r). Have you formed or 
expressed any opinion with 
respect to Steven Ray James 
based on any ot the? statements 
allegedly made by him? 
( r Yes No 
(s). What is/are the statements 
with which you are familiar? 
(t) Do you have any negative 
feelings towards the legal system, 
the participants or the process 
generally as a result of what you 
have learned, know, read, heard 
or seen about the events surround in 
the death ot Steven Roy James. 
22. Following question 52, th 
(a). Does the mere fact that 
Mr. James is charged with this 
offense in the information 
cause you to believe that he is 
probably guilty as charged? 
(b). Do you new presume Mr. 
James to be innocent of the 
crimes as charged? 
(c). Do you feel Mr. James 
is more likely than not guilty 
because he has been charged 
with a crime? 
(d). Do you feel that Mr. James 
has, or should have a burden to 
prove his innocence? 
(e). Do you understand Mr. 
James has no obligation to 
testify? 
(f). Do you nevertheless feel 
he should come forward and 
testify? 
(g). Do you promise to place 
no burden on Mr. James to prove 
innocence, but rather require 
the Gtrifr to prove cjui.lt boyor.d 
a reasonable doubt before you 
could convict Mr. James as charged? 
(h). if, after hearing the 
evidence, you came to the 
conclusion that the prosecution 
had not proven the guilt of the 
accused beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and you found that a majority of 
the jurors believed the defendant 
is guilty, would you change your 
verdict only because you were in 
the minority? 
(h) Yes 
23 Following quest: ion 54, the following: 
(a). Have you ever expressed (a) 
an opinion to anyone about whether 
you believe Steven Ray James is or 
is not guilty of the intentional 
killing of his son Steven Roy James 
.as charged by the State? 
(b). Has anyone else ever (b) 
expressed an opinion to you about 
whether they believe Steven Ray 
James is or is not guilty of the 
intentional killing of Steven Roy 
James as charged by the State? 
Yes Mo 
Yes Mo 
(c). Have you formed an opinion 
as a result of what you have heard, 
read or seen about whether Steven Ray 
James is or is not guilty of the 
intentional killing of Seven Roy 
James? 
(c) Yes Mo 
(d)• Do you have any negative 
feelings towards the legal system, 
the participants, witnesses or the 
media as a result of what you have 
heard, read or seen in the- news 
media about the incident in Loqan? 
(d) Yes No 
(e). Did you discuss the incident 
with anyone at the time it was 
occurring? 
(e) Yes Mo 
(:). Have you discussed it with 
anyone since? 
Yes Mo 
(g) . Have you ever expressed (g) 
an opinion to anyone about how 
the incident in Logan and 
subsequent investigation was 
handled by lav; enforcement 
authori ties? 
(h) . Have you formed an opinion (h) 
about how the incident at the 
Osco Drug Store was handled 
by 1 nw rnfor'^'UHnl ,ni! h'»i il \ t > r. ? 
(i). Do you have difficulty (i) 
making decisions in your every 
day life? 
(j)• D° you have difficulty (j) 
making decisions in important 
matters? 
(k) . Are you accustomed to (k) 
making important decisions 
that affect others? 
(1). Do you make the important (1) 
decisions in your family? 
(m) . Are you acquainted with (in) 
anyone else who has been called 
to jury service in this case? 
(n) . Who? (n) 
(o). Are you related to anyone (o) 
else v/ho has been called to jury 
service in this case? 
(p) . Who? (p) 
(q). What is your relationship? (q) 
(r). Will you suffer any severe (r) 
financial hardship if selected 
to serve as a juror for the next 
three weeks? 
(s). Do you have any strong (s) 
feelings about serving or not 
serving on this jury? 
13 
(t). Do you feci that you 
decision in this matter will be 
criticized by your family, your 
friends, your business associates, 
your church or church members, or 
others. If so, would such criticism 
be of concern to you? 






(v). Would it affect how you 
might vote on the issues of this 
case and the gui11 or innocence 
of any party? 
(v, Ye i 
(w) . Do you have any negative 
feelings or do you feel any 
resentment toward people who are 
accused of crime? 
(w) Yes No 
( x ) . Do you m > 1 in v c pe o pi • • v/l i o 
are charged with crimes are 
always guilty of the crimes charged i -> 
(x) . No 
L q u f stion 5 5, 1: h c f o 1 1 o \ 
(a). If you were in the place 
of one of the parties to this 
case, is there any reason that 
you would not want yourself to 
sit as a juror? If your answer 
is yes, briefly explain. 
(a) Yes No 
(b). Some people who are called 
for possible jury service would 
like to be chosen to serve on a. 
jury, while others would really 
rather not be chosen. Nov; do you 
personally feel about this on a 
scale or 1 to b (Circle appropriate 
number.)? 
(b) 1 Very strongly wants 
to serve 





<i vupv&fju co s e r v e 
5 S t r o n g l y o p p o s e d 
s e r v e 
to 
(c). Have you ever thought that 
courts are too "soft" on those 




(d). Have you ever thought that (d). Yes No 
courts are too "hard" on those 
charged with and/or convicted of 
cr imes? 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ' - day of May, 1909. 
NATHAN HULT t v ' ROBERT 17. GUTKE 
Attorney for Defendant Attorney for Defendant 
:ERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that I delivered the foregoing Requested Questions 
for Submission to Jury Venire on Voir Dire Examination to the 
Office ot the Cache County Attorney, 110 North 100 West, Logan, 
/ ^ y 
Utah C-4321, this ' * day of May, 1939. 




Do you difficulty 
seeing? 
Do you havn ^nv '' i m nil t'.y 
hearing? 
Do you have any medical 
or physical condition that 
would make it difficult 
for you to sit, listen and 
concentrate for extended 
periods of time? 
Are you si ng] e or man*:od? 
How long hav€ \ \ 01 1 ] I 1 t 
Utah? 
a J e : .1 ti 1 dr € .1 1 1 ' 
a 1 ligl 1 school 
graduate? 
'"\ii"» yon ii college graduate? 
Please state your highest 
level of education. 
What i s 01 ir occupation? 
"I II 10 is yoi ir employer? 
I J ho is y o u r s po 1 1 se# s 
employer? 
lave you ^  , . . 
Plaintiff in 1 civil -•: ^ se? 
.ave you c . . . . 
lefendant in -i civil <. *se7 
-en a witiic :,,; «. 
\ . ' case? 
*.• t. > , on a r r e s t e d ? 
21. When? 
22. Where you charged with any 
crime? 
23. What crime? 
24. What was the outcome? 
25. Has anyone in your family 
ever been arrested? 
26. When? 
27. Were they ever charged with 
a crime? 
28. What crime? 
29. What was the outcome 
30. Have you ever been a victim 
of a crime? 
31. When? 
32. Where? 
33. What was the crime? 
34. Has any member of your family 
ever been a victim of a crime? 
35. When? 
36. What crime? 
37. Was anyone ever charged 
38. Was there a trial? 
39. What was the outcome? 
40. Have you ever been a 
witness to a crime? 
41. What was the crime? 
42. When? 
43. Have you ever served on a 















































44. Have you ever served on a 
jury in a criminal case? 
45. When? 
46. What crime or crimes were 
charged? 
47. Are you acquainted with anyone 
in law enforcement? 
48. Who? 
49. What agency? 
50. Have you read, seen or heard 
any news reports or articles 
related to the incident which 
occured in Logan, Utah on or 
about , 1986 involving 
the defendant, Steven Ray James? 
51. Do you feel that under the 51. Yes No 
circumstances you can set 
aside anything you know or 
might have heard, read, seen 
or learned, about this case 
listen to the evidence presented 
to you in Court, apply the law, 
and decide the case fairly? 
52. Do you agree with the 52. Yes No 
principal that anyone charged 
with a crime must be proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt before they can be 
convicted of a crime? 
53. Do you feel that you would be 53. Yes No 
less inclined to believe the 
testimony or statement of a 
person accused of a crime simply 
because he has been charged 
with a crime? 
54. Have you formed or expressed 54. Yes No 
an opinion regarding the 
Defendants innocence or guilt? 
55. Is there any reason why you 55. Yes No 
would not be a fair and impartial 





47. Yes No 
48. 
49. 
50. Yes No 
i iAnioi i D 
Robert W. Gutke - 1281 
Attorney for Defendant 
132 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 75J-7400 
Nathan Hult - 4704 
Attorney for Defendant 
326 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-3 391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, * MOTION FOR INDIVIDUAL, 
SEQUESTED VOIR DIRE 
vs. * EXAMINATION 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, * 
Case No. CR3547 
Defendant. * HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN 
COMES NOW the above named Defendant, by and through his 
counsel, ROBERT W. GUTKE and NATHAN HULT, and respectfully 
represents that: 
1. Defendant has been charged by information with Criminal 
Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a capital felony. 
2. Defendant suggests that the charge against him, 
involving the death ot Defendant's three month old child, has 
been the subject of substantial publicity in the State of Utah, 
and the media attention has not subsided despite the fact that 
almost three years have passed since the child was first reported 
to be missing. In support of this allegation, Defendant refers 
the court to various newspaper articles and television broadcasts 
"f s,if«J J<JC"V,ICJ L .WsCt 
MAY 1 7 1989 
I 
which disseminated statewide and were attached as exhibits to 
Defendant's Motion for Change of Venue. The media continues to 
exhibit a strong interest in the case to the present day and the 
Defendant believes that heavy media coverage will continue as the 
case nears its scheduled trial date. 
3. Defendant avers that because of extensive pretrial 
publicity, individual voir dire will be essential to the exercise 
o£ his right to a full and fair voir dire examination in that 
only individual voir dire will enable counsel to inquire into 
each perspective jurors familiarity with the case without the 
possibility of tainting the remaining panel. 
4. Defendant further suggest that individual and 
sequestered voir dire should be granted in this case, involving a 
charge of capital murder. Because of the fact that the charge is 
a capital felony, complexities ot voir dire examination 
occasioned thereby (see Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 
S.Ct. 1970 (1968), and Article 798 (2)[a]) individual and 
sequestered voir dire should be ordered in this case in order 
that counsel for the State and Defendant can obtain the most 
candid and truthful responses possible in such examination. 
5. Defendant shows that this Motion is filed in order to 
insure an impartial trial of guilt and innocence, as well as any 
penalty hearing in his case, and not for the purpose of delay. 
2 
6. Defendant further requests that the voir dire 
examination be conducted by the individual attorneys and that the 
screening of prospective jurors first be accomplished with a 
juror questionnaire. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully prays: 
1. That all voir dire examinations in connection with the 
captioned case be conducted of jurors individually, and outside 
of the presence of other jurors; 
2. That the voir dire examination be conducted by counsel; 
3. That a juror questionnaire be used to racnitate the 
screening of prospective jurors and the conducting of the voir 
dire examination; and 
4. That he be given full, general and equitable relief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7"^" day of April, 1989. 
^ L\J% ^lt^&t~>~ 
NATHAN HULT 
Attorney for Defendant 
ROBERT W. GUTKE 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that I delivered the foregoing to the Office of 
the Cache County Attorney, llU North 100 West, Logan, Utah 84321, 




EXHIBIT C Tl.iraJ^Uii District 
MAY 1 7 1989 
Robert W. Gutke - 1281 
Attorney for Defendant 
132 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-7400 
Nathan Hult - 4704 
Attorney for Defendant 
326 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-3391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Ofcpu«y CJarK 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, 
Defendant. 
OBJECTION TO VOIR DIRE OF 
JURY PANEL AND DEFENDANT'S 
BEING COMPELLED TO PREMATURELY 
EXERCISE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
Case No. Cft*W7 
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN 
COMES NOW the above named Defendant, by and through his 
counsel, and objects to the manner in which the voir dire of the 
Jury venire was conducted In the above matter. In this regard 
the Defendant submits that the examination of the venire was 
superficial and not designed to elicit sufficient information 
from the venire to adequately frame challenges for cause. As a 
consequence the Defendant was compelled to use peremptory 
challenges to excuse jurors whom It is believed would have 
identified areas where challenges for cause could properly have 
been raised if the court had allowed sufficient inquiry into 
matters pertaining to possible prior knowledge of the panel and 
areas of potential bias. 
1 
The Defendant previously made motions for voir dire with 
counsel asking questions of the jury, Individual and sequestered 
voir dire, conducting voir dire in small panels of three persons 
or less, for the use of a Juror questionnaire prepared by the 
Defendant and the submission <>f a series of questions to 
supplement the basic questions asked by the trial Judge. In each 
Instance, Defendants efforts to elicit relevant information 
concerning the prospective Jury have been unsuccessful, and the 
Defendant has been required to exercise challenges for cause 
prematurely. Consequently, the Defendant has been denied the 
opportunity to have a representative Jury hear a first degree 
murder charge. 
During pretrial scheduling conferences the Defendant and 
counsel were assured that the defense would be pleased with the 
Jury selection. The trial court indicated that the parties would 
be given ample opportunity to get to know the Jurors, and the 
Defendant was led to believe that the trial court would permit 
questioning of the Jury panel to a sufficient degree that the 
Defendant would be able to properly exercise challenges for cause 
with respect to those prospective Jurors where grounds existed 
for challenge. 
Although the prosecution has stipulated that it will not 
seek the death penalty In the event the Defendant is convicted of 
the first degree murder charge and the trial court has bound 
itself on the record that it will not sentence the Defendant to 
death in the event he is convicted of first degree murder making 
2 
it unnecessary to "death qualify" a Jury pursuant to the 
standards enunciated in Witherspoon it*. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 
(1968), the Defendant nevertheless is entitled to a jury free 
from bias and prejudice. 
This objection is filed not with the expectation that the 
trial court will reverse itself and permit an open examination of 
the jury panel. Although the Defendant submits that the court 
should permit such an examination. Rather, it is filed to 
protect and clearly perfect the record in the event an appeal is 
necessary. The Jury selection process recently completed in the 
above matter is clearly prejudicial and denies the Defendant hit 
constitutional under both the Utah State Constitution and the 
Constitution of the United States to a fair trial of his peers. 
The requests of the defense for effective and meaningful 
voir dire have been denied in each instance in what appears to be 
an effort by the trial court to speed up process and complete the 
Jury selection process in one day. As a consequence the voir 
dire of the jury has been superficial and has not permitted the 
defense to elicit Information from the panel which would permit 
the defense to intelligently challenge a prospective for cause. 
The result then is that the defense is forced to use peremptory 
challenges to disqualify Jurors who arguably would be excused for 
cause if the voir dire were more extensive and meaningful. Two 
possible remedies suggested by the defense are (1) to reopen voir 
dire and permit a more meaningful examination of Juror's 
attitudes and biases and (2) to permit the defense to have 
3 
addition peremptory challenges. With regard to the latter, see 
Moon vs. State, 464 So.2d 77 (Miss. 1985) where the defense was 
permitted additional peremptory challenges where 12 of the 39 
venirepersons were closely related to law enforcement, and State 
vs- Nellr 457 SoJ2d 481 (Fla. 1984) where the defense was given 
additional peremptory challenges to cure prejudices that pervaded 
the Jury selection process. The conviction in Nell was still 
reversed because the appellate court ruled that the granting of 
additional peremptory challenges to the defense still failed to 
cure the prejudice. 
After the trial court In the instant case had completed its 
questioning and identified 34 prospective Jurors from the panel 
of 58 who had received pretrial publicity through the news media, 
the defense sought to examine the panel individually but out of 
the presence of the others as to the nature of the publicity and 
opinions concerning the defendant's guilt or innocence based upon 
the pretrial publicity. This request was denied summarily by the 
trial court. The defense also sought to inquire privately with 
the 16 members of Jury panel who identified themselves as having 
close personal ties to law enforcement. This request was also 
denied• 
However^ when the prosecution requested the private 
examination of two Jurors, number 20, Gloria Peak, and number 43, 
Carol Eggenberger, the request was readily granted by the court. 
Thereupon Ms. Peak was excused by the trial court for cause from 
4 
information obtained and only obtainable through the individual 
inquiry. 
The examination and subsequent challenge of Ms. Peak is 
supportive of the defense's contention that individual voir dire 
would permit the venireperson to more openly express himself. 
Shortly before the trial court examined Ms. Peak privately, the 
entire venire, including Ms. Peak, had been asked If anyone had 
discussed this case or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or 
innocence of the Defendant. Without exception there was silence 
from the venire, and the inference was drawn that none had spoken 
with others concerning the case. Yet Ms. Peak, who previously 
had identified herself as being employed by the same company that 
earlier had employed the Defendant, readily admitted moments 
later that the Defendant was the topic of discussion around work 
at the time of the arrest and that it was generally believed that 
he was guilty. Following the private inquiry and the information 
elicited from the prospective Juror, the trial court excused Ms. 
Peak for cause. 
The defense submits that a "speedy" selection process is not 
the determining factor in whether the process Is fair. Although 
it may be true that the conducting of the voir dire by the trial 
court and cutting off the inquiry of counsel as to areas of 
concern will undoubtedly result In a speedier selection process. 
It is equally true that the trial court's conducting the voir 
dire may result in the selection of a panel which is biased and 
unduly weighted to the prosecution. The rights of the Defendant 
5 
to a fair and impartial Jury transcend the seating of the Jury in 
one day where it appears that the only reason for the accelerated 
process is to get on with the trial. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully prays: 
i. That the court reopen voir dire; 
2. That the court permit voir dire examination in connection 
with the above case to be conducted by respective counsel of the 
partles; 
3. That the voir dire, whether conducted by counsel or the 
court, be outside of the presence of other Jurors; 
4. That the questions previously prepared by counsel and 
submitted to the trial court in the form of a Juror questionnaire 
be used to facilitate the further screening of prospective Jurors 
and the conducting of the voir dire examination; 
5. That the questions submitted to the trial court as a 
supplement to the trial court's questions be posed to the venire; 
and 
6. That the Defendant be given full, general and equitable 
relief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^"-day of May, 1989. 
fHXN H U L T l ROBERT W. GUTKE NAT A ULT 
Attorney for Defendant Attorney for Defendant 
ft 
(7ERTTH0ATE QE PKUVRRY 
I certify that I delivered the foregoing to the Office of 
the Cache County Attorney, 110 North 100 West, Logan, Utah 84321, 
this ^**i day of May, 1989. 
^ ^ t C j ^ J .^^gjf^ 
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EXHIBIT D 
Robert w. Gutke - 1281 
Attorney for Defendant 
132 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-7400 
Nathan Hult - 4704 
Attorney for Defendant 
326 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-3391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, * 
Plaintiff, * MOTION TO SUPPRESS ANY 
REFERENCE TO DEFENDANT'S 
vs. * CALIFORNIA CONVICTION 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, * 
Case No. CR3547 
Defendant. * HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN 
COMES NOW the above Defendant, through his counsel, ROBERT W. 
GUTKE and NATHAN HULT, and moves the above entitled Court for an 
order prohibiting the prosecution from introducing as an 
aggravating circumstance evidence of Defendant's prior conviction 
in the State of California. Defendant has heretofore filed a 
Motion in Limine seeking to prohibit the prosecution from using 
the California conviction for purposes of impeachment. By this 
motion the Defendant further seeks to restrict the prosecution's 
use of the California conviction as an aggravating circumstance 
under Section 76-5-202(1)(h). 
Wherefore, the Defendant prays for an order and instruction 
prior to trial that no testimony, questions or proof be allowed 
1 
pertaining to Defendant's California conviction. in support of 
the motion to suppress the California conviction as an 
aggravating circumstance and of the motion to limit testimony and 
preclude use of the conviction for purposes of impeachment, the 
Defendant has attached his memorandum of points and authorities 
and by this reference incorporates the same. 
Submitted this / ^ day of April, 1989. 
NATHAN HULT 
Attorney for Defendant 
ROBERT W. GUTKE 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that I delivered the foregoing MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
ANY REFERENCE TO DEFENDANT'S CALIFORNIA CONVICTION to the Office 
ot the Cache County Attorney, 110 North 100 West, Logan, Utah 
84321, this * 3 day ot April, 1989. 




E::.-BIT e Thira Jucicicj District 
MAY 1 7 1989 
/ \l^>SAt.ri.A(:i:co^|>r/) - .. 
By ^  ^  s ^ ^ (fV^^ -^^g^_ 
Robert W. Gutke - 1281 
Attorney for Defendant 
132 North Main 
Loganf Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-7400 
Nathan Hult - 4704 
Attorney for Defendant 
326 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-3391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT 
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN 
COMES NOW the above named Defendant by and through his 
counsel, Robert W. Gutke and Nathan Hult, and, having heretofore 
filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative a motion for a 
directed verdict, moves the above court for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict entered herein. In support thereof, 
the Defendant respectfully submits that the evidence does not 
support a reasonable conclusion that the Defendant either 
intentionally or knowingly caused the death of his infant child. 
Furthermore, the jury was improperly instructed concerning the 
weight to be given to circumstantial evidence. The jury should 
have been instructed that to convict upon circumstantial evidence 
the evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence. Where the charged offense and the defendant 's alleged 
connection therewith res t wholly upon ci rcumstant ia l evidence, 
and the evidence presented was reasonably consis tent with the 
innocence of the defendant , the t r i a l cour t should hold as a 
matter of law that there is not subs tan t i a l evidence to support 
conviction of the defendant. See Sta te vs . Burch, 115 P.2d 911 
(Utah 1941). Therefore, the defendant submits that the t r i a l 
cour t should se t a s ide the v e r d i c t en te red here in and t h a t a 
judgment of not g u i l t y should be en te red in accordance with 
d e f e n d a n t ' s mot ion. Defendant prays t h a t a judgment of not 
gu i l ty be entered accordingly. 
DATED t h i s 17th day of May, 1989. 
t^ Lt 
NATHAN HULT 
Attorney for Defendant 
ROBERT W. GUTKE 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF PERSONAL DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT to 
James C. Jenkins and Jeff R. Burbank, Deputy Cache County 
Attorneys, 110 North First West, Logan, Utah this 17th day of 
May, 1989. 
Ys<^ J~L\) • sCd^ZZ^. 
BIT F 
MAY 1 1 1989 
^ T l ^ t - C O ^ V . ^ -Robert W. Gutke - 1281 
A M * n r n o y f o r D ^ f o n r l n n f -
132 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-7400 
Nathan Hult - 4704 
Attorney for Defendant 
326 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-3 391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs • 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO RECORD DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTION FOR NEXT LOWER 
CATEGORY OF OFFENSE 
Case No.S^££fcG-T 
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN 
1 F ^ 
COMES NOW t h e above named Defendant by and th rough h i s 
counse l , Robert W. Gutke and Nathan Hul t , and moves the above 
cour t pursuant to Sec t ion 76-3-402, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, for an o r d e r d e s i g n a t i n g D e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n of 
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the F i r s t Degree, to one of Criminal 
Homic ide , Murder in the Second D e g r e e , or C r i m i n a l Homicide , 
M a n s l a u g h t e r . In t h i s r e g a r d , t h e a b o v e named D e f e n d a n t 
r e s p e c t f u l l y submits t h a t the na tu re and c i rcumstances of the 
offense for which the Defendant was found g u i l t y do not evidence 
an i n t e n t i o n a l or knowing k i l l i n g of t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s i n f a n t 
c h i l d . Fur thermore , the Defendant through h i s counsel submits 
that it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being 
for that category of offense, namely a capital felony, for which 
the Defendant was convicted. Therefore, the Defendant 
respectfully petitions the court for an order designating the 
conviction to a lower category of offense, namely Criminal 
Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, or Criminal Homicide, 
Manslaughter, and further petitions the* court to impose snnt-nnn^ 
accordingly. 
DATED this 17th day of May, 1989. 
. -,„> YW*M <^Y^ 
NATHAN H U L T 7 ROBERT W. GUTKET 
Attorney for Defendant Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF PERSONAL DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MOTION TO RECORD DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR NEXT 
LOWER CATEGORY OF OFFENSE to James C. Jenkins and Jeff R. 
Burbank, Deputy Cache County Attorneys, 110 North First West, 






I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the 
State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Now, 
by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is based on reason and one 
which is reasonable in view of all of the evidence. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the mind 
and convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act 
conscientiously upon it. A reasonable doubt is a doubt from the 
evidence or the lack of the evidence in this case. 
If, after an impartial consideration and comparison of all 
the evidence in the case, you can candidly say that you are not 
satisfied of the defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable doubt. 
But, if after such impartial consideration and comparison of all the 
evidence you can truthfully say that you have an abiding conviction 
of the defendant's guilt such as you would be willing to act upon in 
the more weighty and important matters relating to your own affairs, 
you have no reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt must be a real, 
substantial doubt and not one that is merely possible or imaginary. 
Also, if the circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two 
reasonable interpretations, either of which is as reasonable and 
likely as the other to his innocence, it is your duty to adopt that 
interpretation which points to the defendant's innocence, and reject 
that interpretation which points to his guilt. If, on the other 
hand, after a full and fair consideration and comparison of all of 
the evidence in this case, you can reasonably explain the fact in 
question on any reasonable grounds other than the guilt of the 




To warrant you in convicting the defendant, the evidence 
must, to your minds, exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than 
that of. the guilt of the defendant. That is to say, if after an 
entire consideration and comparison of all the testimony in the case 
you can reasonably explain the facts given in evidence on any 





Two classes of evidence are recognized and admitted in 
courts of justice, upon either or both of which, juries lawfully 
may base their findings, whether favorable to the State or to the 
defendant, provided, however, that to support a verdict of guilt 
that evidence, whether of one kind or the other or a combination 
of both, must carry the convincing quality required by law. 
One type of evidence is known as direct and the other as 
circumstantial. The law makes no distinction between the two 
classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as to 
their effectiveness in d e f e n d a n t s favor, but respects each for 
such convincing force as it may carry and accepts each as a 
reasonable method of proof. 
Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in 
question consists of the testimony of every witness who, with any 
of his or her own physical senses, perceived such conduct or any 
part thereof, and which testimony describes or relates what thus 
was perceived. All other evidence admitted in the trial is 
circumstantial in relation to such conduct, and insofar as it 
shows any act, statement or other conduct, or any circumstance of 
fact, tending to prove by reasonable inference the innocence or 
guilt of the defendant, it may be considered by you in arriving at 
a verdict. 
EXHIBIT 
Robert W. Gutke - 1281 
Attorney for Defendant 
132 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-7 400 
Nathan Hult - 4704 
Attorney for Defendant 
326 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-3391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, * MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
vs. * 
Case No. WiQtttnf.**? 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, * 
Defendant. * HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN 
COMES NOW the above named defendant, STEVEN RAY JAMES, 
through undersigned counsel, and pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure (Section 77-35-24, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended) moves the above entitled court for an order 
granting the defendant a new trial. Defendant through his 
counsel asserts that the granting of a new trial is in the 
interest of justice and that the rights of the Defendant were 
adversely and substantially effected by the manner of the jury's 
deliberations ,-jrKl the returning of a verdict of guilty when one 
ot the trial jurors did not believe that the defendant had 
intentionally or knowingly killed his infant son, and in fact 




his son but panicked after the child was accidentally killed and 
then disposed of the body. In support thereof, the undersigned 
has attached the affidavit of Cindy Barton-Coombs, a law clerk 
whor at the direction of the undersigned, interviewed trial juror 
Valerie McCoy. By this reference the undersigned incorporate the 
affidavit of Ms. Barton-Coombs as Exhibit "A". 
The Defendant further alleges that after discovered evidence 
corroborates Defendant's testimony that the driver's door of the 
Cadillac automobile photographed by the Logan City Police 
Department' (that being the vehicle from which the James infant 
was kidnaped) was unlocked. In support thereof the undersigned 
has attached the affidavit of Frederick Reed Stalder, present 
owner of the automobile, and by this reference incorporates the 
Stalder affidavit as Exhibit ,fB". The undersigned further 
attach a series of photographs of the Cadillac automobile as 
Exhibit "C" which show the position of the door lock when the 
lock is in the locked position. Defendant alleges that the 
evidence cited herein is corroborative of the kidnaping and 
evidence that should properly be brought to the jury's attention. 
Again, the Defendant alleges that the granting of a new trial is 
in the interest of justice and that the rights of the Defendant 
were substantially adversely effected by not having such evidence 
available at trial. 
Submitted this 26th day of May, 1989. 
NATHAN HULT ~ ROBERT W. GUTltE 
Attorney for Defendant Attorney for Defendant 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that I delivered the foregoing MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL to the Office of the Cache County Attorney, 110 North 100 
West, Logan, Utah 84321, this 26th day of May, 1989. 
/.: irktnfaYj^fynxj^ 
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Robert W. Gutke, Bar #1281 
132 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Nathan Hult, Bar #4704 
326 North 100 East 
Vernal, Utah 84321 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Steven Ray James, 
Defendant. 
State of Utah ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Criminal No. $cfl'lCC(e(r/7 
Judge Pat Brian 
Affidavit 
I, Cindy Barton-Coombs, being first duly sworn deposes and 
say: 
1, That I was employed by Mr. Robert Gutke to interview 
the jurors 
that gave the verdict in the above ent.n !ed case. 
2, ,n!»fi' "ine of. the jurors I interviewed was Valerie G. 
McCoy of 1067 East Robins Way, Sandy, Utah. 
3. That Ms. McCoy did tell mp thai nt mi l ime during the 
trial, delibeidtion or since was she convinced that Mr. James 
had intentionally murdered his baby. She stated that she felt 
that there was circumstantial evidence, but that it was never 
proven if the baby was in fact murdered. It was her feeling 
that an accidental death was very likely, and that; Mi J;um ;s 
may have paniced and wronqf:ully disposed of the baby's body. 
That it wai a result of the wording "r * v"» luiy 
instruction?; cc. ;• ; ; i : ;j law on murder, that made her 
beleive that she must convict Mr. James of murder if he haa 
wrongfully disposed of the body that ..•-.-•- : nr a 
gu11fcy verdict, 
U^^^/?^Z^ - (^ n^ Jb^  
Sworn and subscribed before me this ^pcb day of May, in 
Notary^Public 
Residing at:/)AJMr L4^€ ^ U^UrM 
My Commission expires:^^^) 
Robert W. Gutke, Bar #1281 
132 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Nathan Hult, Bar #4704 
326 North 100 East 
Vernal, Utah 84321 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Steven Ray James, 
Defendant. 
State of Utah ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Affidavit 
I, Fredrich Reed Stalder, being duly sworn do say the following: 
1. That I am the current owner of a 1974, 2 door Cadillac 
automobile, VIN 6D47R4Q-220.056; that I bought the automobile from 
Ray Dorris in October of 1988; and that the car is at my residence 
at 5095 Smiley Dr., Taylorsville, Utah. 
Criminal No. S^I^OOU?? 
Judge Pat Brian 
2. That the lock on the dri "ci • •> side ut the car is locked 
when it i r" -- , 'he window sil or top of the car door, That 
the lock .3 urrently stuck in the lock position and ain e 
unlocked. The lock worked correctly when I bought the car. 
3. i hat" the pictures that I have been shown taken by Mr. 
Gutke's office correctly depict the locked cond * \zr> •*, door, 
Frederick Reed Stalder 
Sworn and subscribed before me this^^^lj^ay of May^^9Hff|\ N 
Notary Public 
Residiny J t: 
My Commission expires: 
CAR0UEE\ICAUU8TER I 
Murray, Uftft §4107 ! 
JUL 2 0 « 8 9 
*D0PJW C : a* 
Robert Gutke - 1281 
Attorney for Defendant 
132 North Main 
Logan, Utah S4321 
Telephone: <801) 753-7400 
Nathan Hult - 4704 
Attorney for Defendant 
326 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-3391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKF COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





AFFIDAVIT OF NATHAN HULT IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No. "3047 
Honorable Pat B. Brian 
COUNTY OF CACHE: 
ss 
STATE OF UTAH : 
I, Nathan Hult, upon oath state as follows: 
1. I was one of the two attorneys representing Steven James 
in the trial in this case which began on May 1, 1989. 
2. During the first week of trial, one the state's 
witnesses, Kevin Christiansen, a detective with the Logan City 
Police Department, testified that after his arrival at the scene, 
he entered the James vehicle from the passenger side and unlocked 
the driver's door and that Exhibit 66, a photo of the interior of 
s c e n e s h o w p ' r 
3 . r 
p o l i c e v » ? f o r e h e **n\*-*iv il The c a r a t t h e 
~» c . t , 1 
wtianse ^ J 11 % ' 11 r i T'i * I HI F« *• i 1 "l 
• "i I I i " * h e d e f e n s e 
r o o m 
K'K 
_ ~ * - * . , , «ea i i n g . 
4 . - • - - • ; i f . a m i f i e t i n ! < h i b i + b 6 i n 
a n d i n f <-;-<*- * ^~ * f < * * * « r-- • , i ; b o w e d <-.> * 
o f t h e ' i ^ » '*. r ' S i t x o n arvi t H-.« • „ 
) p • i > '.'el" i I'IL-I Cc3i I r onn V i c t o r i a De L e o n , ..tit'-- r n u I il i I I h 11 I 11, * « 
d o o r i t l o c k e d o n l y win «• " I I | I I h e l u c k i L: down f l u s h 
a g a i n s t i h e i n i i . 1 •'.• • J L 
5 . T h a t , e v e n i n g nt ™ ' . s a m e .luv i t i1! h \ . " ' < n s t i a n s e n 
t e s t i f i e d , . ' ' o n t a c t e d IV-ti..i * , a , ,.( A n d r e w s a n d r e q u e s t e d h i s 
a s s i s t fir" • • n I'-' l o c a t i n g t l ie v e h i c l e s o t h a t wt r o u l i i c hi . i "I h e 
p o s i t i o n Mi t h e l o r k i n t h o L o c k e d ^ot- i i i i i i i , e x p l a n u n c j l o h i m 
-*•'.' *— *-•* i i «->"r.ri . i ^ : i, * n i'u f , G t r 3 t c - : * r * * * .^=> 
a r i 1 / . . . —-.--ii u i i i o c ' d i" a t h e r t n a n 1 r , c k e u a . - -
t o 1 .i t: J * - e . MJ i • t h i s e ^ ^ d 
r -s i ^ 
t f : r* 
. o n a e r w n e a Lfit* 
T>Q !
 c tor ia 
, h i JL£' L i a n s ^ 
w h e r e 1+ v 
^ p r a rvH 
* J o w ~ n o n j Ji ^ v_. i u i t 
e F, e n T i 
- . a i L j A n a r e * ' " • .1 L ' •«i» t o o b t a i n a n y more? i n f o r m a t i o n 
3 
for me that week but on the following Monday told me that 
Victoria De Leon had been contacted by Detective Christiansen but 
could not remember who she had sold the car to and had no 
documentation regarding the sale. 
8. I then had my secretary attempt to trace the title 
through the Idaho Transportation Department due to the vehicle 
having been most recently titled in Utah, but no information 
would be provided to us by phone and could only be provided upon 
sending a $3.00 title search fe-. 
9. Upon receipt of this information by our office on May 
22, 1989, we discovered that th? vehicle had been retitled in the 
State of Utah. (Exhibit 1). Thereafter we contacted the Utah 
Vehicle Division of Business Regulation which eventually provided 
us with the name of Fredrick Reed Stalder of Taylorsville as the 
current titled owner of the vehicle. (See Mr. Stalder's 
affidavit attached to Motion for New Trial.) 
Nithan Hult 61/ 
Attorney for Defendant 
Subscribed and sworn to before rne this j <X day of July, 1989. 
Notary Public 
Residing at: l-C^QA) CfT 
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give not u ? ' r.at I rr.-j i . * o .* copy cif the foregoing1: 
NATHAN HULT IN iTPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL to 
_ * - ^ — _ _ — -_. _ . 
Jam*--.- •". Jenkins Jeffrey Burt ink 
1 *>: *,•*- County Attorney Peouty County Attorney 
I N-r • h 100 West - North 100 West 
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Robert Gutke - 1281 E X H I B I T ^ 
Attorney for Defendant 
"••^ V-rth Main 
. .n, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-7400 
NaUian Hult - 4704 
Attorney for Defendant 
326 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-3391 
ITJ 'rill' l.riTllllT rnilHT ni' THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AJ iALT J COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
Plaintiff, * TRIAL 
STEVEN JAMES, " as" Mr* • <t f00^,7 
Defendant, .HHHH ULIL i'at k\ Brian 
COMES NOW tli'? Defendant
 r
 fi' nvi'n "nv Tarn-.s, by his attorneys,, 
UIULI mi I siiniii lc I'll I IN I I and Rule 8L(«) of t he Utah HHJPR of 
LLvu Procedure moves for a new trial hrinn*'1 r\t\ NIMU " i„ I1 i vi'n'ii 
evidence which by 'hir^  J i 1 urjftin"i-« mil i i h^en discovered in 
iinw' " ' ,i • i , ! . , ,"i I under Rule 77-35-24 ot the ULalk Lode 
"iI Criminal Procedure. 
Since the Renewed approximately 
Se A-AtrLniq Statement ed approximately 
September ,. Defendant ha 
(Exhibi* -** "'enneth jwovemDer in which 
: .. '.X.J ^ w.tnosses, •" Petersen 
inmate : ; he Uta ^  --*-••* T 
attempted . ^ ^:^, j : -i confessi n c: _ __. 
Ray James. 
Ron Petersen was the final trial witness of the State in its 
case-in-chief and testified to overhearing a conversation between 
. .<:von Ray James and another inmate in the Cache County Jail about 
how the James baby [victim] died, in which "In fact, he said he had 
done it, to Jon [the other jail inmate]". [Transcript p. 923, 1. 
9, attached as Exhibit 3]. Petersen went on to testify that James 
told Jon he had been down to the Valley View Marina [the location 
where the infant's body was later found] the day before the baby 
disappeared. [p. 923, 11. 10-18]. Petersen had admitted during 
cross-examination that he was trying to stay out of prison when he 
made this statement to Detective Kevin Christiansen. [p. 929 11. 
19-23]. The attached Affidavit of Kenneth Lisner is the first 
solid evidence that the Defendant has that Ron Petersen's story to 
law enforcement was fabricated. 
The evidence of Ron Petersen was critical to the State's case 
which, apart from his testimony, was based entirely on 
circumstantial evidence. Defendant asserts that the granting of 
a new trial is in the interest of justice and that the rights of 
the Defendant were adversely and substantially affected by this 
witness's perjured testimony and the Defendant's inability, until 
the present, to effectively rebut that testimony. 
Defendant therefore prays this Court approve the Motion for 
New Trial based on this new evidence. 
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DATED Hav r . December I ,ltl I 
Robert Gutke 
Attorney for Oe 1 ein.liinil 
Nathan Hult 
Attorney for Defendant 
MA T r.? M— CE RT"F1'' ^ 7* 
1 hereby give notice thu )L the foregoing: 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL to the below itaiUCu individuals on 
, 1989. 
James Jenkins 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
110 North 100 West 
Logan, Utah 84321 
89/2 
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AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH LISNER 
STATE OF UTAH : 
SS 
COUNTY OF CACHE I 
Kenneth Lisner, upon oath, states as follows: 
1. About the middle of April, 1989, while in the Utah State 
Prison, I met another inmate by the name of Ron Peterson. 
2. During one of our discussions, we talked about an article 
from the Los Angeles Times dealing with a man by the name of Leslie 
White and how inmates were fabricating confessions of other inmates 
and falsely testifying in court in order to get out of jail. 
3. Ron then told me of how he unsuccessfully tried to work 
a deal to keep from going to prison or doing more time in jail by 
fabricating the confession of another jail inmate, Steven Ray 
James, who was unknown to me at the time. 
4. By the end of April when the papers indicated the James 
case would soon be coming to trial, Ron Peterson received a 
subpoena. When I asked him what was up, he said he wasn't going 
to go through with his little game. He was just going to go and 
get some tobacco from the jail. 
5. This was the last I saw of Ron Peterson except o^ 
news. I then wrote myself a note reminding myself to wri 
letter to Mr. James' attorney when I got out of prison. 
6. Steven Ray James was placed in my tank at the Utah : 
Prison in June. I then approached Mr. James and gave hire • 
information that I knew Ron Peterson had committed perjury aga.iv---
him. 
asked me to v 
because i 
didn* *o draw attention nyself before I w^nt before the 
Parole Board. 
Ill I  I ii in mi in ii mi i in in 1 1 in i in I in mi in ill I11 w < > I i n i n in I i I II 1 1 t i A l I l u l i i v i l b e c a u s e i f . I L B 
not f 1 on. Mi. « James lu be convicted and in prisoti after a til I 
^h Ron Peterson committed perjury. 
Kenneth Lisner 
Subscribed sworn to before me this 
1989. . 
N o t a r y Piibli. 
Residing at: 
My commission expires: 
RONALD RAY PETERSON, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the State, being first 
duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BURBANK: 
Q. Please state your name for the record. 
A. Ronald Ray Peterson. 
Q. Mr. Peterson, it is true that you are presently** 
incarcerated in the Utah State Prison, being temporarily held 
in the Salt Lake County Jail as a result of a felony 
conviction; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I am going to direct your attention to the months of 
October, November and December of 1986. Did you have an 
occasion during that period of time to be incarcerated in the 
Cache County Jail? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In that period of time in which you were 
incarcerated, were you sharing a cell with the defendant, 
Steven Ray James, one Jon Lippencott, and a Travis Goodwin? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. During your period of incarceration in the Cache 
County Jail, were you Continually incarcerated with the 
defendant, Mr. James? 
i 
A. Yes, I was. 
921 
Q I n the p e r i o d of November tn December1 ""I ' ii," 
an o c c a s i o n t o overhear a ]\itu M: ivjuen Uk. defendant 
"-'.i I « j a m e 3 # a n c j j I M I u p p e n c o t t , c o n c e r n i n g t h e c a u s e of 
tii ol tlie I n f a n t ? 
Y e s , I y\ i I 
Q. Do v o n r e c a l l T-Thn"- was s a i d ' 
MR. •'•'!'• i"«» w H o n o r , ma y i<«"' "»p f,• \• o i -, , 1\, • 
T H E C O U H T VIM I . 
\\\ jit the-record d i s c u s s i o n at the b e n c h . ) 
T H Z C O U R T , D o <mii h-ire in nnj'»<'i" >> 
M R . G1J TI r i , i
 i:l i 11 t o u n d a 11 o n , 
Till. COURT': S u s t a i n e d . 
Q. 'Mr, P e t e r s o n , d u r i n q f in 11 •. > i * i",.i! i. in I li-n.'v a l r c . u 
I n d i c a t e d , r|n /UHI i« i > i • j i i iuulu luive t a k e n p l a c e ? 
A I ! iM 111 l a t e November, December , 
0. Where d i d i t t a k e p l a c e ? 
' " " a d i t ; i ' . • , i I I , 
i Hi""i" w a s p r e s e n t ? 
, _ e JL i , Juki LI ppe n r. * t i i 11 KI I 1i . j 11 d S t e v e n 
1
« *? viu h r a i Mr . J a m e s s p e a k ? 
I ri i i , ' ' • 
i I i I I..1 ,Jpeaking t o ? 
Lippencott. 
w e r e vn1,: W'-UMI U H I Mi i i i j L o n v e r s a t i o n ? 
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A. Inside the cell with them. 
Q. Approximately how far away would that have been? 
A. Approximately about maybe four to five feet. 
Q. Do you recall what they were talking about? 
A. About the death of the baby, what was going on in 
court. 
Q. What did Mr. James say in regards to the death of 
the baby? 
A. In fact, he said he had done it, to Jon. 
Q. Were you also present — during this same 
conversation was there a conversation concerning the Bear 
River marina, also known as the Valley View Marina, on the 
Bear River? 
A. Yes. He said he had been out there the day before. 
Q. The day before — 
A. The incident had happened. 
Q. The baby had disappeared? 
A. Yes. 
MR. BURBANK: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Cross-examination? 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GUTKE: 
Q. How old are you? 
A. 20. 
Q. When did you go into the Cache County Jail, rein: . 
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to this period? 
A, October 29. 
Q. Who were you housed with that first night? 
A. Steve, Jon, and then later Travis came in. 
Q. You were housed immediately with Mr. James? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. And with Jon Lippencott? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where specifically was that within the jail area? 
A. That — it was just like, as they say in prison, it 
was presentence, before you got sentenced, while you was still 
going to jail -- or to court. 
Q. How long were you in there? 
A. For approximately about -- I would say about four 
months. 
Q. You are familiar with the terminology as to 
different areas witnin the jail itself? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. Different cell blocks? 
A. A little bit. I don't remember too much about the 
jail. I jhaven't been up there since I was 18. 
Q. Do you know an area called C block? 
A. Yes. If I recall, that's the one we were in. 








































I believe that was next door to us. 
That also is an area of the Jail? 
Yes. 
It designates what type of prisoners are in that 
Yes. 
And a geographic area of the jail, as well; is that 
I think so. 
But your recollection is you were in C block? 
Yes. 
Were you in this same block area of the jail the 
entire period of time you were in jail in Cache County? 
A. 
security 
No, I wasn't. We had been moved to the maximum 











When was that? 
That was approximately at the end of the four 
At the end of the four months, you go into maximum? 
Yes. 1 
That's after January of 1987, then? 
Yeah. ' 
This conversation you claim that you overheard c 
place in the maximum security area? 
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A. No, it didn't. 
Q. It took place where? 
A. In C block. 
Qt What time of day was it? 
A. That's a good question. We don't have no clocks in 
there. 
Q. Morning, afternoon, before lunch, after lunch? 
A. At night. 
Q. After supper? 
A. Yes. 
Q, Before lights out? 
A. Sometimes. Mostly after lights were out. 
Q. You have talked about a specific occasion when you 
said that he claimed that he did it. I want to know when that 
conversation took place. 
A. If I remember right, it was during the night. 
Q. After lights out? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where were you at the time? 
A. Just across from him, in the top bunk. 
Q, You were housed with him continuously, all the time, 
up until the time you were sentenced? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. From October 29 up to whenever that was? 
A. Yes. 
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Q.' When were you sentenced, do you know? 
A. I donf t remember. 
Q. Were you sentenced to the state prison at that time? 
A. No, I wasn't. 
Q. Probation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You later had the terms of your probation violated; 
is that correct? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Because of some actions you had taken while you were 
on probation? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. You are telling me this was sometime towards the end 
of November that you heard the conversation you have testified 
about? 
A. Between there. November and December. 
•Q. Give me the earliest it could have been. 
A. I can't state that, because we didn't have 
calendars, and I don't know. 
Q. Let's talk about some holidays during that period of 
time. You are familiar with the Thanksgiving holiday? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's the last Thursday of the month of November. 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. Do you recall if this conversation LUUK place before 
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pr after Thanksgiving? 
A. If I remember right, some of it took place before, 
and some of it after, 
Q. There was more than one conversation, then? 
A. There was quite a few, 
Q. How many times are you claiming that he said that he 
did it? 
A. I claim that I heard it once. 
Q. When was that, I am asking you, now, then? 
A. At night, and sometime in November. 
Q. Before or after Thanksgiving? 
A. After. 
Q. Do you know when the defendant's preliminary hearing 
was? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Do you recall if this was before or after Christmas? 
A. I don't know. I wasn't involved in the preliminary 
matters. 
Q. I am talking about the conversation now. 
A. Before. 
MR. GUTKE: May I have a minute to look through this 
deposition, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
(A brief pause in the proceedings.) 
Q. Steve James never did point blank come out and teli 
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you that he killed the baby, did he? 
A. No, he didn't. 
Q. In fact, he never personally ever talked to you all 
about this offense, did he, or the charges pending against 
him? 
A. No, he didn't. 
Q. When was the first time you reported this incident 
to any law enforcement personnel? 
A. I know it was in November. I don't recollect the 
exact date or time. 
Q. Who did you first talk to about it? 
A. Kevin Christonsen. 
Q. In November of 1986? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At or about the time that you claim that the 
conversation took place; is that right? 
A. Well, it was like before — it started — he started 
talking, and then I explained to Kevin what was going on. 
Q. You were trying to work a deal for a better 
sentence, weren't you, at that time? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. Trying to stay out of prison? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you talked to Kevin Christensen in November, 
you talk to anybody else? 
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A. There was another officer there. I don't recall his 
name. 
Q. There is an officer at the end of the table in a 
sweater today. Have you seen that officer before? 
A. I don't think so. I don't know. 
MR. GUTKE: I would have the record indicate I have 
designated towards Mr. Andrews. 
THE COURT: The record will so reflect. 
Q. Do you recall reporting this incident to him? 
A. It is hard to remember. It has been over two years. 
Q. The only person you specifically recall is Kevin 
Christensen? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were there other officers, however, you may have 
talked to? 
A. No, there wasn't. 
MR. GUTKE: Nothing further, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Redirect? 
MR. BURBANK: In regards to defense counsel's 
questions, he never told you he killed the baby, these 
conversations you have been testitying about and concerning 
were not with you directly? 
THE WITNESS: That's true. 
MR. BURBANK: Also, in regards to Counsel asked you 
about making a deal, the State never made a deal with you, dir 
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they? 
THE WITNESS: No, they didn't. 
MR. BURBANK: Thank you. I have no other questions. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
Any objection to the witness being excused? 
MR. BURBANK: None, your Honor. 
MR. GUTKE: No. We may want to recall him. We know 
where he is. 
THE COURT: Does the State rest? 
MR. BURBANK: May we have just a moment, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
(A brief pause in the proceedings.) 
MR. JENKINS: Your Honor, with the reservation 
on Exhibits 15 through 18, as previously noted, we will rest. 
THE COURT: Counsel will approach the bench. 
(An off-the-record discussion at the bench.) 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, the Court will 
take the morning recess. Inasmuch as we have had one recess 
already this morning, we will be in recess for ten minutes 
instead of 15. Do not form nor express an opinion, do not 
discuss the case among yourselves, do not permit anyone to 
discuss the case in your presence until the matter has been 
submitted to you for your deliberation and your decision. The 
Court will be in recess for ten minutes. 
(Court was in recess.) 
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